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COVER



Forty-one years ago, an aviator's togs consisted mainly of goggles and a leather flying helmet. The pilot on our cover, however, wears more than a dozen special articles of clothing and equipment as he dashes for his plane in Korea with the "Bull Horn" blaring "Scramble." The difference the years have wrought was brought home in a practical way to our artist, Pfc Tony Kokinos, who checked out a set of jet-pilot gear from Navy Supply to use as props in painting the cover. While painting, he kept a jaundiced eye on the expensive stuff, making certain that the Forty-First Anniversary of Marine aviation didn't find him holding the bag for \$250 worth of equipment. Back Cover: May 16th is Armed Forces Day.

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
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Having Had It

Dear Sir:

Cdr Shaw's article, *I'd Had It*, in the February *Gazette* reminded me of a story in *Leatherneck* a few years ago about the new commanding officer who, at his first inspection of the Shanghai Marines, ordered the regiment to remove their khaki blouses on the hot and humid parade ground, only to find the whole regiment standing in skivvy shirts adorned with khaki cuffs and collars.

I'd like to suggest that an *I'd Had It* article be a regular feature of the *Gazette*. There is hardly a Marine who cannot think of some incident in his career in which he thought "he had had it."

Norfolk, Va.

SHERMAN W. BARRY
LtCol, USMC

ED: If ever you've had it, by all means let us hear about the incident.

Seeing and Reporting

Dear Sir:

I have just finished reading the March issue of the *Gazette*. I especially enjoyed the intelligence article *See it—Report it*, by Capt Roe. However, in listing the various intelligence collection agencies he fails to mention one of the most valuable and important sources of information—the tactical air observers.

Quantico, Va.

W. D. ARMSTRONG
Maj, USMC

Repairmen Wanted

Dear Sir:

I am writing you in regard to SSgt Gallagher's letter, "Teletype Headaches."

Each month the *Gazette* pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the *Gazette* requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

As a message center chief in the 8th Signal Bn, FMF-Lant, I, too, have teletype headaches. We have a platoon of teletypists with machines . . . but no teletype repairmen. The teletype repairmen are located with the wire platoon. We are frequently on field problems and maneuvers, and whenever one of our TG-7s goes on the blink we have to call the wire chief for a repairman . . . resulting in a waste of time and a backlog of traffic.

I think this problem could be remedied by having the message center platoon T/O changed, eliminating three messengers and adding three repairmen . . .

ROBERT L. CRITTENDEN
MSgt, USMC

Want to Reenlist?

Dear Sir:

In regards to Sgt Spitzley's letter in the February *Gazette* on volunteer extensions for personnel entering the Marine Corps through Selective Service, I would like to call his attention to Marine Corps Memorandum No. 132-52.

Under its provisions, a man can reenlist for two years after serving one year in a Selective Service status; then if he still desires to stay for another short period, he can extend his enlistment for one year . . .

WILLIAM G. SCHILB
TSgt, USMC

Roanoke, Va.

Repacking



Dear Sir:

. . . Why not replace the blanket roll with a water-repellent encasement or bag? This container could be zipper operated, the zipper starting approximately six inches from one end and ending six inches from the other. The blankets and shelter-half could be rolled speedily and placed in this bag, therefore saving a great deal of time. Other advantages would include uniformity, neatness, and protection against dampness and frost. This type roll would stay secured while walking, running, or crawling, and wouldn't forever be catching on brush or similar hazards. Four half-

moon brass rings could be attached to the sides of this bag and two rings to the top for fastening the roll to the pack.

Would it be possible to attach sponge rubber covered clamps several inches higher up on the pack than the straps are presently? The pack, no matter how it is fastened, is so constructed that it constantly drags. The weight is not carried *on* the shoulders but *from* the shoulders. Straps similar to the rifle sling could be attached to the clamps with hooks on the end, led from the clamps through a brass half-moon ring fastened to the cartridge belt, and then hooked onto the strap. (For goodness sake, do away with the belt suspenders.)

Perhaps an outside pocket, similar to a kangaroo pouch, could be attached to the rear of the pack below the pack flap. A man then could store either his mess gear or some other essential item in this pocket. It is a waste of time to take out numerous articles from your pack just to get one item.

Please, even if no major changes are made, tell someone to lengthen all the straps on the pack. In cold and damp weather these straps often shrink, making them impossible to work with. Even if they do not shrink, they are too short for use in cold weather. Furthermore, the loops on the pack through which the blanket straps pass should be enlarged . . .

Korea

EDWARD R. MILANI
SSgt, USMC

Dear Sir:

From *Blueprint to Battlefield* in your January issue brought to mind a problem many of us have experienced—the blanket strap. Packs have been modified, vehicles redesigned, and equipment improved to make the Marine Corps even better, but the blanket strap remains the same. Many a Marine has sweated and sworn endeavoring to get the present strap fastened around a two-blanket roll or a roll consisting of sleeping bag, shelter-half, pins, and poles. For those who must roll their blankets, please may we have about four more inches in length on the blanket strap!

Camp Pendleton

EDWARD B. MEYER
Capt, USMC

LVT(A) in Korea

Dear Sir:

I have just read with great interest LtCol Croizat's excellent article *Amphibian With a Future* (February) and also recall LtCol Miller's *Amphibious Artillery* (August, 1952). Both authors offer valuable ideas for the more effective employment of LVT (A)s. As an officer who held both infantry and armored am-

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MALAYA—Sikorsky S-55 and S-51 helicopters have strengthened British forces in Malaya, where their ability to operate without prepared landing fields is particularly valuable, in the struggle against communist guerrillas.

Here a group of S-55s flies in review at the Royal Navy Air Station, Gosport, England, before embarking for Malaya on a British aircraft carrier. They were supplied under terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.


AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



KOREA—A mine-spotting Navy Sikorsky HO3S helicopter takes off from its floating base on the deck of an LST somewhere off Korea. From a hovering position, its pilot can spot submerged mines not visible from shipboard. With helicopter-minesweeper teamwork, safe channels can be cleared quickly, and danger reduced to a minimum.



LABRADOR—Pilots of Marine Air Group 26 gave their HRS Sikorskys a workout over the bleak Labrador coast recently in training maneuvers. Specialized tactics, made possible by the extreme mobility and utility of helicopters, were tested in ship-to-shore operations. The Sikorskys were based on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Kula Gulf*.



HOLLAND—When the raging North Sea inundated lowland areas of Holland and England, thousands of victims were carried to safety by helicopters from American, British and Dutch military units. Sikorsky S-55 and S-51 types again demonstrated helicopter versatility, rescuing victims from the flood and bringing in relief supplies. Here an R.A.F. S-51 lands on a road isolated by the flood.



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phibian commands in Korea, I heartily support their views.

Since no mention was made in either article of present operations, I feel readers might be interested in knowing of one specific role played by LVT (A)s now in Korea . . .

During the fall and winter of 1951-52, the LVT (A)s, under Maj David Foos, left camp on frequent amphibious artillery raids. Taking advantage of their amphibious ability, the LVT (A)s landed on offshore islands, went into battery, and very effectively bombarded unsuspecting enemy coastal targets.

It has always been a mystery to me why these raids were not expanded to include Marine landing parties when it was clear to everybody in the area that abundant targets were offered and that Marine morale and proficiency would profit by a few amphibious raids.

Ardsley, N. Y.

HARRIES-CLICHY PETERSON
1stLt, USMCR

Fox Hill

Dear Sir:

As a small tribute to the officers and men of A/7 who fought so courageously under my command in Korea, I submit a minor correction to Capt R. C. McCarthy's inspiring article *Fox Hill* which appeared in the March 1953 *Gazette*.

When the 1st Bn, 7th Marines arrived at the Fox Company position, it was Able Company, *not* Charlie, that set up the defense with Baker Company on the high ground to the south. Able Company remained in the Fox Company area only long enough to eat a hurried meal, our second after leaving Yudam-ni on the morning of 1 December.

Quantico, Va.

E. M. HOVATTER
Capt, USMC

Leading With the Right

Dear Sir:

. . . It has come to my attention that the Landing Party Manual is contradictory in describing "Steps and Marchings" under individual instruction without arms.

Chapter II, Section II, Paragraph 2-9, a (1) of the LPM states: "When executed from a halt, all steps and marchings, except right step, begin with the left foot."

Paragraph 2-9, j, (1) states: "To face to the right (left) in marching and advance from a halt, at the command of execution of the movement, turn to the right (left) on the ball of the right (left) foot, at the same time, step off with the left (right) foot in the new direction with a half or full step in quick or double time as the case may be."



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... In other words, to face to the left in marching and advance from a halt, at the command of execution of the movement turn to the left on the ball of the left foot, at the same time, step off with the right foot in the new direction.

If a company in column formation were to execute the movement as described in the interpretation, the second, third, and fourth platoons would be out of step with the first platoon, as the first platoon would step off with the right foot. If a platoon were to execute this movement, and the pivot man was the only one governed by this paragraph, then he would be out of step with the rest of the platoon . . .

EVERETT C. KEOWN
Miami, Fla.
Sgt, USMC

ED: *As far as we can find, Sgt Keown is correct in his interpretation of the conflict between the sections in the LPM.*

Fire Team Origin

Dear Sir:

... As a platoon leader in the Second Raider Battalion I maneuvered fire teams all over the Kuni grass and mountains of Guadalcanal and concur heartily that credit for the organization of this unique, but now common Marine tactical unit, the fire team, belongs to one man, Evans F. Carlson. We had three men to a fire team, (armed with M-1, TSMG, and BAR) with three fire teams to a squad led by a corporal. This in itself was a mighty potent task force. The Japanese probably thought every Marine in the outfit was armed with a machine gun. The unit of fire was 160 rounds per M1, 360 rounds per TSMG, and 420 rounds per BAR, plus two hand grenades per man.

CLELAND E. EARLY
LtCol, USMC

Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

This discussion on the origin of the fire team could probably go on forever. However, to add one point to Col S. B. Griffith's letter in the March issue, liaison between the raider and parachute battalions was very close. The 2d Parachute Battalion at Camp Elliott was already working with the fire team concept in early 1942 when Col Carlson organized his raider battalion there. The 2d Parachute Battalion, of which I was then the S-3, had started its work after an exchange of letters with officers in the 1st Parachute Battalion. I have no doubt that Col Carlson had his own ideas on the subject quite some time before that. He, like most infantry officers, was intensely interested in the reports from Europe at that time. These reports included information of the squad "battle drill" being tested by the British. The fire team was a natural

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
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extension of our own triangular concept down to the squad level.

The idea was in the minds of many officers, I'm sure. It merely happened that as new organizations, the parachute battalions had the *opportunity* to experiment with new formations and tactics which the line units did not. The raider battalions, when formed, enjoyed that same freedom. The parachute rifle squad was ten men; the raiders were the first to try the thirteen-man squad.

ROBERT T. VANCE
Col, USMC

Eye Appeal

Dear Sir:

During the past few years I have had an opportunity to make a survey to ascertain why Marines do not like to wear the marksmanship badge. I found, in making inspections of troops in ranks, that they almost invariably wear the sharpshooter and expert badge when they rate it, but they don't like to wear the marksmanship badge because it doesn't have "eye appeal" . . . it doesn't look "sharp."

It is my opinion that the marksmanship badge should be given enough eye appeal to insure that all hands who rate one will wear it proudly. It seems to me that the crux of the matter is the pendant, or rather the lack of a pendant, on the marksmanship badge. Here is my solution.

Simply hang a pendant on the present marksmanship badge. It could be similar to the one on the sharpshooter badge, and I believe it would serve to give it eye appeal.

After all, when a Marine goes on liberty in uniform he likes to wear something that will cause civilians, male and female, to look at him and be impressed. The present design of the badge is not impressive. . . .

Quantico, Va.

PAUL E. SANDERS
Capt, USMC

Family Interest

Dear Sir:

I have been reading your wonderful magazine for a little over a year and I must say it is as interesting as any I have had the pleasure of reading. My husband is with the 5th Marines in Korea, and because of the *Gazette* I feel I know a little more of what he is doing and understand the Marines a little better.

Recently, I received my copy of *Leatherhead in Korea*. My thanks to SSgt Norval E. Packwood for this great book. . . . Is it still possible for me to order *Leatherhead in Boot Camp*?

Mahomet, Ill.

MRS. ALBERT D. MILLER

Ed: *Leatherhead in Boot Camp* is still available through the *Gazette* bookshop, price \$1.00.

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
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our authors

• 2dLt Frank E. Copeland (*Answer Their Questions*, page 36) probably agrees whole-heartedly with the old quip "the first cruise is the hardest." Lt Copeland enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1940, and was on Guam when World War II broke out. Consequently, he spent the greater part of his first Marine

Corps cruise in Japanese prison camps.

He was commissioned a year ago and now is in charge of officer procurement for the New York area.

• The author of *Passed Over!* (page 24), who signs himself, **Per Aspera**, is an experienced officer who writes from personal knowledge of his subject, having been both passed over and picked up. In substantiation of his theses that benefit may be found in any adversity, he pointed out to us that he was probably the first officer in Marine Corps history (by virtue of having sold his article to the *Gazette*) to make money out of having been passed over. "Experience keeps a dear school," he ruefully quoted Franklin, "but a fool will go to none other."

Maj Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr. tells of the continuous training of Marine units in Korea in his article, *Static War — Aggressive Training* on page 40. After entering the Marine Corps as an enlisted man when he was just seventeen, Maj Nicholson was commissioned in 1942 and, since that time, has served as CO of the Marine Detachment of the USS *Monterey*, in the Enlisted Performance Division of HQMC, as public information officer of two recruiting divisions, and, most recently, as the



2dLT COPELAND

S-3 of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in Korea.

Maj Nicholson is now serving as the Secretary of the Development Center at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

• *Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass*, (page 16) was prepared for the *Gazette* by **Lynn Montross** who, in his own words, has "a passion for historical research." Mr. Montross is in a

good position to indulge in his "passion," for since 1950 he has been a historian with the Historical Branch of the Marine Corps. He was born in Nebraska, but has lived in many states since, and has spent several years in France. He has had half-a-dozen or more books published, including *War Through The Ages*, and *Rag, Tag and Bobtail*.

• **Cpl Paul G. Martin**, writing from Kew Gardens, N. Y., says, "Marines always ask me how I liked service with Recon." His answer, based on thirty-seven months of duty with reconnaissance companies, in and out of combat, is contained in *We Stalk The Enemy* (page 28). Discharged in February 1952, Martin is now with the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City.



MAJ NICHOLSON

• *There's Sense In Those Billions* (page 58) was co-authored by **LtCol H. B. Benge** and **LtCol R. C. Williams Jr.** USA. LtCol Benge enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1932, and was commissioned in 1938 after graduating from the Naval Academy. At the present time he is staff officer for Marine Corps matters in the Assistant Secretary of the Navy's office.

LtCol Williams has just finished an assignment with the War Plans Division of G-3 in the Pentagon and is presently attending NATO college

prior to assignment to duty with NATO in Europe.

• Assigned to do a historical article on aviation, something "with a slightly different twist," **Sgt Cliff Spieler** came up with *Beyond Duty's Call* (page 48). Sgt Spieler, a member of the *Gazette* editorial staff, is a graduate of Syracuse University and the Armed Forces Information School. Prior to

entering the Marine Corps in 1951, he was a school correspondent for three New York dailies, and later a staff writer for the *Geneva (N.Y.) Daily Times*. Before coming to duty at the *Gazette*, Sgt Spieler was editor of the *Cherry Point Windsock*.

• **Capt John Morris Ellicott, USN (ret)**, had a career in the Navy, and retired before most of us were born. In duty afloat, he cruised three times around the world and from the Arctic to the Antarctic oceans. His *Marines at Manila Bay* (page 54) is based, of course, on personal experience. In fact the captain received a commendation from Admiral Dewey himself, for skill and bravery under fire in the Philippines.



1STLT MACDONALD


• **1stLt Douglas J. Macdonald**, now on inactive duty in California, writes on the work of a volunteer training unit in *Speak The Language* (page 33). He attended Notre Dame University prior to entering the Marine Corps in 1943. Lt Macdonald participated in the Peleliu and Okinawa operations, and was in China with the 6th Mar Div after the Japanese surrender. USMC



SGT SPIELER



CAPT ELICOTT



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
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
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Ridgerunners of

By Lynn Montross

AMERICAN EDITORIAL PAGES IN THE SUMMER OF 1951 WERE VIEWING WITH alarm the supposed decline of the nation's young manhood. The news from Korea had not been exhilarating, and a taste of crow lingered in the mouths of critics who had predicted an easy and speedy victory. These critics did not suspect that the Korean "police action" would prove before the end of the year to be the fourth largest military effort of U. S. history, surpassed only by the Civil War and the two World Wars.

The explanation for American withdrawals of the early weeks was found by many editorial writers in the premises that our troops were roadbound. Mechanization had gone so far, they lamented, that we had become the servants rather than masters of our own wheeled and tracked vehicles. Our infantry had neither the legs for long marches nor the backs for the bearing of military burdens. In short, our young men had grown psychologically as well as physically soft, and American mothers were scolded for coddling their boys.

These plausible generalities were soon punctured full of exceptions by the feats of the 1st Marine Division in the Inchon-Seoul operation. But at least the weather was not formidable in September, and it remained for a Marine battalion in December to complete an all-night march that would have dismayed the hardiest coolies in the ranks of the Chinese Communist forces. The temperature was twenty-four below zero when the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines—"The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass"—left the road behind and struck out across the frozen mountains in the darkness. The men had not known a warm meal nor a full night's sleep in more than a week. They had fought an all-day battle that ordinarily would have entitled them to relief and rest. And yet every man had to start the twenty-six-hour march with a burden of ammunition and equipment weighing about a hundred pounds.

In all American military history it would be hard to find a more drastic test of spirit and endurance, or a more inspiring example of leadership. The exploit is all the more remarkable because the 7th Marines contained a larger proportion of reservists than any other outfit in the division. A majority of the officers and men of 1/7 were civilians on the Fourth of July, never dreaming that after Labor Day they would be in Korea.

The circumstances calling for the march on the night of 1 December had been several days in the making. As a preliminary, the 5th and 7th Marines, reinforced by three artillery battalions of the 11th Marines, were committed to an attack westward from Yudam-ni for the purpose of relieving enemy pressure on the Eighth Army, some eighty miles to the southwest. Originally it had been intended by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur for the 1st Marine Division and other X Corps units to combine with the Eighth Army in a "massive compression envelopment" begun by the latter on 24 November. But the Eighth Army was stopped cold the next day by a great Chinese counter-offensive. The same offensive struck the 1st Marine Division on the night of the 27th, as the 5th Marine Regiment was in the process of passing through the 7th and continuing the attack west of Yudam-ni.

Prisoner interrogations established that the 9th CCF Army, consisting of twelve divisions of about ten thousand men each, had moved into the X Corps area while another Chinese army launched a counter-offensive at



of Loktong Pass



the Eighth Army in west Korea. The enemy plan, as revealed by prisoners, called for the Chinese to refuse action whenever possible until two Marine infantry regiments had advanced into the Yudam-ni area, where a finger of the Chosin Reservoir points westward. There the CCF generals planned to isolate these regiments and destroy them piecemeal in a series of night attacks, the form of tactics in which they placed the most trust.

Unfortunately for enemy calculations, the 1st Marine Division was one of the best prepared major units of the UN forces in Korea. Major General Oliver P. Smith, the commanding general, and his staff officers had taken a realistic view of the situation as early as 15 November, despite the reassuring estimates of corps and division intelligence as to enemy numbers and intentions. During the next ten days, while two Chinese armies were secretly infiltrating southward from the Yalu, CG 1st Mar Div directed that the MSR (main supply route) from Chinhung-ni to Hagaru be made passable for tanks and heavy vehicles.

• SUPPLIES AMOUNTING to two units of fire and six days' rations for the division were trucked to Hagaru, where a C-47 air strip was begun and an advanced hospital established.

Even though these preparations were interrupted by a Chinese attack on the 27th, enough had been accomplished so that the division had a fighting chance against the vastly superior enemy numbers.

During the critical first round, the Marine command began planning to seize the initiative and come out fighting as a re-united division. This breakout was to be accomplished in four successive and coordinated phases: (1) the attack from Yudam-ni to Hagaru; (2) the defense of the Hagaru base; (3) the attack from Hagaru to Koto-ri; and (4) the attack from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni, where a comparatively level road led thirty-five miles from the foot of the mountains to Hamhung.

First, of course, came the planning for the Yudam-ni phase. In the lack of wire communication between that perimeter and the division CP at Ha-

garu, radio and message center facilities were not always adequate.* The two regimental commanders at Yudam-ni rose to the emergency, however, by sharing the planning and command on a basis of cooperation. Thus the two units were operating virtually as one after 27 November. On the night of 29-30 November their COs prepared a joint order for the withdrawal of the perimeter to a smaller and more readily defensible position south of Yudam-ni. On the 30th the division commander, General Smith, received orders from CG X Corps to pull all forward units back to Hagaru, and the Marine general sent a dispatch directing the 5th and 7th to expedite execution of their joint operation order and movement to Hagaru.

While these decisions were being made at the higher command levels, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines had relieved one of two companies isolated and surrounded along the road south of Yudam-ni.

Charlie Co (minus one platoon in reserve) was on the southwest slope of Hill 1419, controlling the Hagaru road where it left the valley floor. This unit had also been under CCF attack all night after the Chinese surrounded the position. About forty casualties had been suffered, and the outlook grew more desperate when the artillery radio went out. After the tactical radio was moved into an exposed area to maintain communications, it was cut off by enemy action from the

*Plans made to install a radio relay station on the 28th at Yudam-ni were forestalled by the CCF attack.

rest of the company. Thus the operator could give only a general and sketchy idea of dispositions while reporting the loss of key ground.

Able Co met increasing resistance from the hill masses overlooking the valley south of Yudam-ni, and at noon Baker was ordered out after being relieved by administrative and supporting unit personnel. The relief of Fox Co, holding a hill perimeter near 5,000-foot Toktong Pass, about five miles beyond Charlie, was included in the mission of the 1st Bn, which was directed to be back in the Yudam-ni perimeter before nightfall.

• LTCOL RAYMOND G. DAVIS, CO 1st Bn, a native of Georgia who entered the Marine Corps by way of Georgia Tech, had commanded the 1st Bn of the 1st Marines at Peleliu in 1944 when the thermometer reached such fantastic heights as 110 in the non-existent shade. And now he was about to experience some even more trying extremes in the opposite direction. Already he and the other officers of the 7th Marines had discovered that the effects of sub-zero weather can be militarily crippling. Radios respond poorly or not at all at such temperatures, so that units are deprived of artillery and air support. Howitzers return stiffly to firing position, and carbines are likely to quit functioning altogether. Gasoline motors require constant vigilance, and all vehicle movement is slowed to a crawl by icy and snowy roads.

The effects on the human element of war are even more severe. Not only does extreme cold tend to numb a man physically and reduce his energy, but it also depresses his spirits. At a time when he is most in need of hot meals, he has to satisfy his hunger with frozen "C" rations and his thirst with ice. The necessity for protection may be even more urgent, but he will find it a heartbreaking task to chip away at the granite-like frozen earth with entrenching tools held in bleeding hands. When ordered to advance, he is hampered in his movements by the parka, boots, and other heavy apparel worn for survival. Worst of all, the cold may even paralyze the will to action and self-preservation, so that a man ceases to care what becomes of



him. The next stage, and a tragic one it is, may be a condition akin to battle fatigue, with a man of proven courage being reduced temporarily to a shaken and sobbing wreck.

These were conditions as formidable as enemy resistance to be reckoned with by Able and Baker Cos when they moved out to relieve the third company of the battalion. The plan of attack called for Able to clear the hills east of the road, seize the ground lost by Charlie, and establish a protective perimeter to the east and north. Meanwhile Baker was to attack west of the road and establish a like perimeter to the south and west. In short, the relief was to be accomplished by means of surrounding Charlie Co with friendly units after evicting the Chinese who had been doing the surrounding.

It is not every time that performance comes up to plan, but this was one of those bright occasions. The two attacking companies fell to their work with snap and precision, in spite of the cold, while four Corsairs roared on station overhead. Artillery and mortars blended perfectly into a symphony of destruction for the Chinese caught between two fires after Charlie Co opened up from the southwest slopes of Hill 1419. By late afternoon the enemy survivors were on the run, seeking only escape from the hail of steel and lead.

ON THE ROAD near Hill 1419, during the original advance to Yudam-ni, the 1st Bn had prepared a turn-around for trucks using the narrow mountain road. This bit of foresight now paid dividends, since Charlie Co had been able to hide its casualties in crevices along a draw within 200 yards. Without the turn-around, it would have been necessary to move the wounded into the valley to transport them to Yudam-ni.

Charlie Co led the way back to Yudam-ni, picking up the reserve platoon posted at a key position along the road. Orders to relieve Fox Co near Toktong Pass had been cancelled, since the company commander himself had requested that he remain in position. Having suffered nearly seventy casualties, he felt that he could not come out fighting with so many wounded. He believed that his

perimeter could be held at least another day with the ammunition received by air-drop, and his request was granted. The men of the 1st Bn, however, were much depressed at having to turn back without effecting the relief.

Even with the advantage of the truck turn-around, it took three hours of effort to get the Charlie Co casualties down the trail and into the vehicles. At least the Chinese did not interfere, for they had absorbed enough beating for one day. Thus the 1st Bn was permitted to return unmolested in the darkness to the Yudam-ni perimeter and report its mission accomplished.

The next day, 29 November, saw the failure of new efforts to open up the road from Yudam-ni southward and from Hagaru to the north. That afternoon LtCol Davis was summoned to the regimental CP and given a new double-barreled mission for his battalion — to secure Toktong Pass, and to relieve Fox Co (See sketch, page 22). Only that morning a composite battalion made up of 5th and 7th Marine elements had been forced to return to Yudam-ni before coming within four miles of the pass. Now it was planned to rely on maneuver and surprise.

The problem was one of clearing the way for the breakout of the force at Yudam-ni planned to begin on the morning of 1 December. It was essential to secure Toktong Pass, the key terrain feature of the fourteen-mile route to Hagaru. The enemy would undoubtedly expect an attempt over the road, since the Chinese themselves shunned overland detours in these wild and trackless mountains. The best hope for bringing off a surprise maneuver, therefore, lay in sending a Marine column without vehicles on a short-cut directly across the peaks and ridges to relieve Fox Co and seize the pass. The regimental commander assigned the task to the 1st Bn of the 7th Marines, and left the detailed planning to its commanding officer.

LtCol Davis' orders were simply to cut off eastward from the road south of Yudam-ni, skirt the main CCF defenses, and approach his objectives from the *north* while the enemy guarded the road from the west. The move was to start as soon as the regi-

ments at Yudam-ni could be regrouped to contract the perimeter and pinch out 1/7.

That night LtCol Davis mulled over the special problems presented by the mission. If successful, it promised to open the way to Hagaru, but the risks of failure were proportionately great. The column might conceivably lose its way in the darkness or be delayed by exhaustion, thus giving the enemy time to recover from his surprise and prepare a trap. Experience had shown that the portable radio equipment was not dependable in the mountains at sub-zero temperatures, so that little support could be expected from artillery or air. Resupply or evacuation by air were rendered doubtful by this same communications problem as well as by the snow and overcast. Control of units would further be handicapped by the relative blindness and deafness of men muffled to the eyes in parkas and hoods. Casualties would be particularly hard to handle on the steep and icy slopes at night, and the danger of broken bones as well as severe frostbite could not be overlooked.

THE MISSION WOULD have been a grim enough challenge to a fresh and rested outfit, but the men of 1/7 had been marching or fighting for a week without a warm meal except for their Thanksgiving feast served on 23 November. Most of them were suffering from digestive ills caused by frozen rations, and minor cases of frostbite were the rule rather than exception.

CO 1/7 had another day, after receiving his orders on the 29th, in which to come up with solutions. On the 30th his battalion took part in the regrouping at Yudam-ni, and by nightfall LtCol Davis had the following tactical preparations well underway:

(1) All portable radio equipment to be put in the best possible condition with the parts and facilities available. Pack-set radios (AN/GRC-9) to be carried to provide positive communications in case the portable sets would not range to the Yudam-ni perimeter.

(2) Only two of the 81mm mortars and six of the heavy machine guns to be taken. All to be manned with double crews, however, in order to



carry enough ammunition to keep them in action. For this purpose, an ammo dump to be set up near the point of departure for replenishment of supplies expended during the breakout. Skeleton crews manning the remaining mortars to be stationed near this dump and provide added fires for the breakout, whereupon these men would join the column.

(3) Extra portable radios to be carried for air support. The forward air controller to move out with the battalion while the air liaison officer remained behind with his jeep to guide strike planes to the controller.

(4) The artillery liaison party to carry a pack set (SCR-610) to gain additional performance for artillery communication.

After these tactical steps had been decided upon, CO 1/7 made the following administrative decisions:

(1) All personnel not sick or wounded to go with the battalion, leaving enough walking wounded or frostbite cases to drive the vehicles and move the gear left behind with the regimental train. This group to burn any surplus gear, as directed by regiment, and prevent it from falling into the enemy's hands.

(2) The troops to carry enough rations for four meals, being given their choice of the limited supplies available. In their choice of rations the men favored fruit, candy, crackers—anything that would not freeze. But most of them also carried a can or two of frozen rations under their shirts, hoping that body heat would thaw out the congealed lump in spite of discomfort.

(3) Extra litters to be taken, each serving to carry extra mortar or machine gun ammunition as well as additional sleeping bags.

(4) Each man to leave the Yudamni perimeter with an extra bandolier of ammunition, and personnel of the reserve company and headquarters group to carry an extra round of mortar ammunition up the first mountain for replenishment of supplies depleted at that point.

(5) All men to take sleeping bags not only for the protection of the wounded but also to save their own lives if the column should be forced to remain in the mountains for several days—a hazard that had to be taken into consideration.

Every possible step of these plans had been put into effect on the morning of the 1st, when How Co of 3/7 was ordered to seize a hill mass controlling the area through which 1/7 must pass to initiate its breakout. The task proved too much for one company, and Able and Baker were committed to the effort after the advance of How had been re-oriented to the right flank of the objective. It was afternoon, however, before the enemy could be driven from the objective.

AT DUSK THE BATTALION (with How Co attached) went up against its next objective—Hill 1419, lying about one thousand yards east of the road to Hagaru. The Chinese were dug in along four finger ridges as well as the main spine leading to the summit. A heavy undergrowth sheltered the defenders, though it also gave footholds to the Marines scrambling up the icy heights. Air strikes were laid down just ahead of them, with bombs, rockets, and 20mm fire, but the use of artillery was limited because of the relative blindness of the FO in the brush. Thus it seemed providential that skeleton mortar crews had been

left behind at the ammo dump, for their fires knocked out position after position. Thanks to supporting arms, the CCF remnants were driven from the summit just after dark. Hasty defenses were set up on Hill 1419 and casualties evacuated to the Yudam-ni perimeter. Then the battalion tail was pulled up the mountain and the last physical tie broken with Yudam-ni. The ridgerunners were on their own.

How Co was assigned to the operation at the last moment, which meant that the column would comprise nearly a fourth of the depleted infantry strength of Yudam-ni, where service and artillery personnel had been formed into provisional infantry platoons. This added to the responsibility of LtCol Davis, but he could count on the able support of his four company commanders, three of whom were junior officers replacing wounded captains:

Able Co—1stLt E. M. Hovatter
 Baker Co—1stLt J. R. Kurcaba
 Charlie Co—Capt J. F. Morris
 How Co—2dLt M. P. Newton

Ordinarily LtCol Davis would have given his men a breathing spell after a hard day's fighting. But he feared the effects of the rapidly dropping temperature on troops drenched with sweat after clawing their way up the mountain. Thus the reorganization was pressed with all possible speed after no enemy contacts were reported by patrols ranging to the southeast. By that time the men were stiffening and ready to drop with exhaustion, but orders were issued and guides posted to get the column on the move before 2100. Baker Co was to be the point, followed by the battalion command group, Able, Charlie, and How.

A thermometer reading of twenty-four below zero was reported by the artillery unit in the valley. The night was black with low-hanging clouds that threatened snow in the morning. A few stars showed faintly over the horizon, however, in the general direction to be taken. One of these feeble beacons served as a guide, and a prominent rock mass was designated the initial objective of the march.

Unfortunately, the snow-covered peaks all looked alike, and the star was often lost to sight when the col-

umn was traversing draws. Repeated compass orientations of a map in a frozen hole under a poncho never checked out. The artillery was called upon to place white phosphorus on nearby peaks, but the splash of these rounds could seldom be located.

The advance guard was slowed by having to break a trail in snow that had drifted knee-deep in places. After an ice-glazed path had been beaten, the footing became precarious for troops burdened with about a hundred pounds each. Some serious falls were taken on downhill slopes, and the men had to climb the finger ridges on hands and knees while clutching at bushes or roots.

As COMPENSATION, the maneuver seemed to have taken the enemy by surprise. Or perhaps it could be concluded that the Chinese did not care to undergo similar hardships. At any rate, the Marines had the desolate area to themselves. Distant rifle shots were heard now and then in the darkness, and once a machine gun sprayed the column at long range. But this was the extent of CCF interference during the first stage of the march.

A more immediate danger was loss of control along the route due to the inadequacy of battalion tactical radios. When the head of the column plunged into the blackness of the first deep valley the guide star was lost to sight, resulting in a drift toward the south. If continued, this deviation would take the battalion toward the Hagaru road—an area plotted for friendly artillery interdiction because of the enemy units occupying key heights along the route.

During the crossing of the second valley the southward drift became so pronounced as to alarm CO 1st Bn. Messages were sent forward to correct the direction. When the deviation continued, an order was given for the head of the column to halt on the next ridge.

Radio failures kept Baker Co from receiving this message, thus reducing the command group to that most primitive form of communication—word of mouth. An attempt was made to pass the word up the column, but the men were in a trancelike state of weariness, their ears so muffled by

wraps that many failed to hear the shouts from behind.


All efforts of this sort having failed, a messenger was sent up alongside the column. But still the head drifted southward toward the danger area. Next, the battalion command group tried to move out parallel in an effort to overtake Baker Co. Then it was discovered that many Able Co men were getting out of position and mingling with Baker Co at the head of the column.

This confusion, coupled with loss of direction, threatened a crisis. LtCol Davis left the command group and hurried forward with his radio operator and runner. In the darkness he soon lost touch with them and pushed on alone, panting and stumbling past the single-file column. Some of the men, never suspecting his identity, muttered profane warnings against noise as the battalion commander passed.

It took such an effort to reach the head of the column that Davis did not make it until the men were scrambling up the next steep ridge. There the drift in direction was corrected just in time, for the battalion was running into its first serious opposition.

It was determined later that the column had been heading up Hill 1520, the north slope of which was held by the enemy. An increasing volume of fire was received as CO 1st Bn gave orders to company officers for a reorganization of confused units in preparation for attack. Exhausted as the men were, they summoned a burst of energy from their numb bodies and advanced into positions surrounding the enemy. Part of the CCF group was caught asleep and all of the enemy force destroyed as Baker and Charlie Cos closed in from two sides. But the bark of the mortars aroused the Chinese on adjacent hills, and they opened up with long range fire.





It took until 0100 for the Marine column to set up a hasty defense on Hill 1520. During the move into position the troops seemed finally to have reached the limit of endurance. Suddenly they began collapsing in the snow—"like dominoes," as an officer later described the spectacle. And there the men lay, oblivious to the deadly embrace of the cold, heedless of the wailing Chinese bullets ricochetting from rocks in the area.

"The bodies of the troops," said CO 1st Bn later, "were not as strong as their spirits." A strange scene ensued as company officers and NCOs moved up and down the lines of prostrate men, shaking and cuffing them into wakefulness. At last they staggered to their feet and moved into position. Their officers could sympathize even while demanding new efforts, for the sub-zero cold seemed to paralyze the brain as well as the body. CO 1st Bn said afterwards that he checked and rechecked every decision, just to be sure that his own weary brain was functioning accurately.

Certainly he had no reason later to regret his decision to form a tight perimeter at 0300 and allow the troops a rest—their first after twenty hours of continual fighting or marching under a double burden. The extra ammunition carried on the men's backs was appreciated at this point, however, since it enabled the four companies to feel more secure.

Upon the arrival of the pack radio set, it was assembled to re-establish contact with the regiment—the first that it had been possible to make since 2000. Then the perimeter was organized with small and continuous patrols within companies to insure that men on watch kept awake. As the perimeter formed, an enemy counterattack developed from the southwest, but it was beaten off by Able Co. The Chinese gradually ceased their long range fire, and an eerie silence fell over the wasteland of ice and rock.

All efforts so far to reach Fox Co by radio had failed. CO 1st Bn felt certain, however, that he was within extreme range of friendly 81mm mortars, so that it would be dangerous to move closer without radio contact. He decided to let the men rest until dawn, therefore, on Hill 1520.

At daybreak the firefight with the

enemy was resumed at long range, without much harm being done by either side. Friendly aircraft came over for missions, but the control radio set could not make contact with them, and relays through tactical channels proved ineffective. Orientation was simpler in broad daylight, and the commander ordered an attack in the direction of Fox Co.

Charlie Co seized an intermediate ridge covering the advance of Able and Baker toward a major hill mass overlooking the Fox perimeter. Just as the command group mounted this height, the radio operator shouted to LtCol Davis. So choked with emotion as to be incoherent, he finally got out the words:

"Fox Six on the radio!"

Events moved swiftly after this contact. Under cover of an air-strike controlled by Fox Co, the men of Baker raced down the slope to join a Fox patrol and move into the perimeter. It was 1125 on the morning of 2 December.

How Company and then Charlie covered the rear while the remaining units of the column moved into position. After grounding their packs the men immediately went back to carry the twenty-two litter-borne casualties into the perimeter. Parachutes ac-

quired as a result of air-drops in the Fox Company position protected the wounded from the cold so well that only two deaths occurred among the litter casualties after arrival at the perimeter. These tragic instances testified to the night's ordeal, for both men had been placed in improvised strait jackets after cracking under the strain. They died before further evacuation was possible.

Fox Co had held a 360° perimeter for five days and nights against the attacks of Chinese in estimated regimental strength. Supplies and ammunition were received by air-drop, and the Corsairs kept the enemy at a distance in daylight hours. The casualties included six of the seven officers, among them Capt William E. Barber.

No prolonged rest was possible for the men of 1/7 while part of the mission remained undone. Baker Co paused only long enough for the troops to eat a meal of air-dropped rations. Then they moved out to seize a nearby ridge controlling Toktong Pass. Able Co followed shortly afterwards, and the two companies set up their own separate perimeter for the night.

THE REST OF the 1st Bn troops were used to strengthen the Fox Co perimeter or form a reserve for the tasks of the next day. Radio reports had confirmed that the Yudam-ni regiments were slowly but steadily fighting their way along the road toward Fox Co and Toktong Pass. The scheme of maneuver called for 1/7 to act as advance guard when the main column reached the pass. But the night of 2 December passed quietly in the Fox Co perimeter, with a heavy snowfall taking charge of the situation.

Fires were lighted throughout the perimeter at dawn in a deliberate attempt to draw fire and ascertain the location of CCF positions. The enemy kindly obliged by opening up from two nearby ridges. One CCF group was just about to occupy a southern spur of the height held by Able and Baker Cos. The other group held a ridge extending eastward beyond Toktong Pass toward Hagaru.

Simultaneous attacks were launched at these positions by the troops of the two Marine perimeters. The purpose was to clear the enemy from the area

around Toktong Pass, and to orient the battalion toward Hagaru in anticipation of its mission as advance guard. By noon the Marines had driven the enemy from both ridges, so that only scattered long range fire was being received in the area. A large group of Chinese abandoning the southern ridge withdrew into the path of How Co, 5th Marines, the right flank guard of the advancing Yudam-ni column. How Co was informed that the Chinese were moving toward them. The ensuing action was brief and emphatic, ending with the annihilation of the enemy group.

LATE ON THE afternoon of 3 December, 1/7 led the way when the Yudam-ni column pushed on from Toktong Pass toward Hagaru. How and Fox Co troops were attached to the battalion as it advanced methodically against scattered resistance. Small teams of about ten men each were sent out to occupy key points along the route until relieved by flank elements of the Yudam-ni column. These teams reported the flushing out of Chinese so exhausted by cold and hardships that they had abandoned their arms and hidden in holes to get away from it all.

Other Chinese groups had some aggressive spirit left, and several more hard fights awaited the column of Yudam-ni troops. But there could be no doubt that they would reach Hagaru, and messages from that base reported the repulse of large enemy forces in two savage all-night battles. This meant that the two preliminary phases of the 1st Mar Div breakout had been accomplished, and it would be hard to stop the reunited division when it fought its way from Hagaru to the seacoast after evacuating casualties by air.

The ridgerunners of Toktong Pass had proved that even in this era of mechanized warfare and great firepower, the age-old principles of maneuver and surprise are still potent weapons. And, perhaps most important of all, these Marines had proved that an outfit of American young men could not only outfight their enemy but also beat them at their own game of marching and enduring hardships.

US MC





PASSED OVER!

■ BEING PASSED OVER IS A LITTLE like having had an illegitimate child or a hanging in the immediate family. Conceivably, statistically, it *could* happen, but, if it does, nobody wants to talk about it.

Maj Donald W. Swanson breached this taboo—for taboo it is—in the February 1952 *Marine Corps Gazette* with a first-rate article (*If You Weren't Selected*) which told the Marine Corps public some of the “why's” of failure to be selected.

As far as the non-selectee is concerned, however, Maj Swanson's analysis reads somewhat like a lecture on pedestrian safety for delivery at the bedside of a guy who has just been knocked down by a truck: it may help other pedestrians, but it won't do this victim much good.

This article picks up where Swanson stopped.

If you weren't selected—what next?

That's the first question the passed-over officer asks himself as soon as the initial numbness and trauma have passed. And if it isn't his first question, then it should be—what next? What can he do? What should he do?

Should you quit outright, resign? Should you quit less obviously, stay on the payroll, and wait out your time? Should you get drunk and try to forget it? Can any effort on your

part lever you out of that tight little group at the very top of the lineal list in your rank?

Horatio Alger as it may sound, the answer to that last question is, yes.

It can be done.

Say that over again, you who have been passed over, and then start the damage-control program which may save your career.

The immediate problems which face you are those of attitudes, yours and theirs. The “they” in this equation is the Marine Corps at large, your seniors, your contemporaries, and your subordinates.

Of all these, *your* attitude is by far the most important as well as the most immediate problem, because it in turn will determine and shape other people's attitudes toward you as a “passed-over officer.” (Get used to the term; you'll have to live with it.)

Chances are, you'll get the word some time during working hours. Bad news travels fast, and it may well be half-way around the command before you hear about it. Bear that in mind, because it means, whether you like it or not, that a lot of people, both those you work for and those who work for you, will be watching to see how you take it. Naturally, you'd give anything to be able to pass the next few days in a dark, cool cave.

Instead, those days will be spent in the limelight. *How you comport yourself in that limelight may have a direct bearing on whether or not you get picked up on the next list.*

The first step in getting your attitude under control is to admit to yourself *why* you were passed over. Despite what you may hear contrariwise around the bar, the non-selectee does not live who doesn't have at least a general idea as to the reason (s) for his downfall.

Oscar Wilde confessed from his prison cell after a deeper, darker downfall than a hundred consecutive pass-overs. “No man, great or small, is ever ruined save by his own hand.”

Often it may be hard to confess, even inside, the reason why your name didn't make the list, but you do know, don't you?

Further—and I may get arguments on this — there are very few really “bum raps.” One or two, maybe, but, if you knew *all* the story in each case, you'd probably go along with the selection board.

Now that you know the worst, and now that you've faced up to the *why*, here comes an even higher hurdle: living with it. The sooner you reconcile yourself to the fact that it's all so, the better for you. In truth, your personal damage-control operation is al-



By "Per Aspera"

ready underway if you can begin this new phase in your career the very day the ax falls. Take a few drinks when you get home, if you need to or want to, but for heaven's sake take them in private, and not too many, because tomorrow will be critical.

The morning after you've been passed over, break out your best uniform, give your shoes an extra lick of Kiwi, get a haircut if you can, *and then try to do the best day's work you've ever done in your life.*

Everybody will be watching, remember; and everybody roots for a game loser. To the extent that failure of selection is a function of accumulated service reputation (and it often is), you will have few more dramatic opportunities to show how good you really are.

By the fact of being passed over, you inevitably focus attention. Conduct yourself under this scrutiny so that people can see you at your best. They'll sympathize and hope to see you picked up next time.

Aside from concentrating on doing an even better job than you were doing before, you will find help in a few other pointers on attitude for the newly passed-over:

(1) Be calm and realistic—quietly cheerful or resolute, if you can manage it. But don't kill yourself smiling through tears, and don't gab and crack hollow jokes. Mainly, be yourself. Nobody expects you to be hilari-

ous at a time like this, but make it plain that you've come to terms with being passed over, and have the situation, as a good Marine should, well in hand.

(2) Don't try to hush it up that you've been passed over. Everybody reads the selection board's report with a red pencil and a lineal list, just as you yourself have done in the past. Most people know what happened to you, if not why. Don't carry it about as a gnawing, secret shame.

(3) On the other hand, don't cry on every shoulder, and don't bore the Marine Corps with indecent exposure of your particular situation; in Osler's fine phrase, "learn to consume your own smoke." Simply acknowledge the fact that you've been passed over (which will relieve your friends, because it means they won't have to walk all around the subject for fear of offending), and, if elaboration

seems in order, make it brief. For example: "Yes, I lost a couple of hundred numbers—got into a hassle with my battalion commander. He won."

For some personalities, riding out the first crisis may be easiest, just the way certain individuals hold out readily under the immediate stress and catharsis of tragedy, but fold up later when life settles down.

New crises, at any rate, new heartbreaks, lie ahead. In many ways these may be harder to meet because sympathy toward you will no longer be fresh, and your fellow officers will take your trouble for granted, and expect you to do the same. As far as you personally are concerned, the succeeding heartbreaks may be worse than the initial shock—and you must endure them with even greater fortitude.

For example, the day when your classmates receive their new commis-

sions: the swearing-in ceremony; the new insignia of the rank you missed; the wives in new dresses (probably bought with accumulated back pay); the largesse of cigars. Those things are hard to take, and take them you must. Be unobtrusive that day, but don't hide, and don't show the hurt. And be generous to your classmates; they're still your friends. Treat them as such, and try to be glad of their good fortune. Moreover, as a practical matter, remember that now they are heading for higher jobs—jobs from which they may well be able to give you a lift or a helping hand.

Another tough one to take will be the first occasion when you have to take orders from some officer who was junior to you only a few months before. If he's a classmate or a friend, the problem will be relatively easy, for you can meet the situation by tacit, graceful acceptance of the new relationship; and he can ease things for you by not rubbing it in, and by common tact. On the other hand, if he's a relative stranger, put your pride in your pocket, observe every military courtesy thoroughly and meticulously. He'll be alert for your attitude, depend upon it; and it will be points in your favor if you show him self-discipline and willingness to "eat dirt in the line," as Gen Bradley once put it.

So much, then, for attitude.

But, you ask, other than taking it gamely and exercising common sense, aren't there things you can do? Must you suffer immobile, and wait and pray for the next selection board?

Indeed you can do a number of important things—things which may tip the scales in your favor next time, or, if worst comes to worst, the time after that. (Note for the passed-over: never give up hoping, but never give up striving; Micawberism won't get you picked up, but good, hard work probably will.)

Here are matters on which you should concentrate:

(1) *Essential elements of information:* Even though you know, in general, why you were passed over, check and analyze your official record. If at all possible, get up to Marine Corps Headquarters and go through your jacket with a fine-tooth comb. I know one officer, passed over, who abstract-

ed the markings on every fitness report he'd ever received, in order to determine, cumulatively, the weak spots and the general pattern of his markings. He learned a lot about himself, and he improved himself, too.

(2) *Pattern of assignment:* Sometimes an officer's pattern of detail works against him. Maybe it did in your case. Take steps to correct this; seek duty which is professionally improving. Have you served lately in the Fleet Marine Force? Have you graduated from the school appropriate to your level? When did you last command troops? Make your desire for such assignments a matter of record, both in your fitness reports, and, stronger still, by writing an official letter indicating preference for next duty, with reasons. That will show you're still trying and haven't collapsed in the traces.

(3) *Correspondence courses:* Another way to demonstrate that you're still in the game is to attempt to better yourself professionally by appropriate correspondence courses. There are many: The Extension School at Quantico, and the Naval War College come immediately to mind. The training itself will make you a better officer, and the certificate of graduation on your record will advertise the fact.

(4) *Personal smartness:* Despite good intentions, almost everyone tends to judge others on appearances, on externals. Are yours all they should be? Keep your hair cut, your shoes shined, and your uniforms in tip-top shape. Carry yourself smartly. Avoid at all costs the appearance of being a "broken-down, passed-over officer." Observe every military courtesy.

(5) *Application:* Apply yourself hard and zealously to your job, whatever it is. Put in extra licks when you can. This sounds elementary, but your reporting seniors will soon notice it and assess you accordingly.

(6) *Friction and controversy:* A passed-over officer is in a poor position to wage controversy. He already has at least one strike against him, and an unsuccessful, unlucky argument could convert the situation into a strike-out. This may well mean putting your pride in your pocket a few times when you know you're right. If you'd rather be right than picked up,

go ahead and fight it out, but this may be just the time to live to fight another day. A man clambering up a precipice by his fingernails does as little thrashing around as he can.

(7) *Relations with your commanding officer:* Seek the right opportunity to enlist the assistance of your commanding officer. Before such an opportunity can be made, however, you must deserve it. Be sure he is aware you have been passed over; that will usually win you the benefit of any doubts. And if you've been doing well, it will prompt him to accord you maximum recognition. Your reporting senior can do more to help you back on your feet than anyone else in the Marine Corps. Seek and deserve his aid.

"And having done all," to quote St. Paul (*Ephesians*, 6:13), "then stand . . ."

Stand unbowed by ill fortune, and you will find yourself a better officer. Adversity, though you may not immediately recognize this, is a disciplinarian. Adversity is also a means to see yourself and to learn what you are good for and what you can endure.

In a nutshell, what lessons can we distill from this business of being passed over?

They are these:

For the passed-over officer: Never give up. Face your situation intelligently and resolutely. Realize the stern rewards of adversity.

For those who have never been passed over: If your passed-over contemporary or subordinate represents an asset or potential asset to the Marine Corps, help him to salvage himself. If he earns it, give him a break. The recipient never forgets loyalty downward in such a time.

For the Marine Corps: Get the most from those who have stumbled or fallen, by keeping their hopes alive. Prove in public that comeback is possible, by picking up passed-over officers who show that they have the stuff to fight back into good standing.

And, if you've been passed over, before you put this article down, turn back to the pen-name which I've used—*Per Aspera*. That phrase is lifted from a gallant proverb of ancient Rome, *Per aspera, ad astra*: "Through adversity—to the stars!"

USMC

KOREA AWARDS



Navy Cross

SSgt Rollins M. Bryant, Capt Uel D. Peters.

Distinguished Service Medal (Air Force)

MajGen Clayton C. Jerome.

Silver Star

PFC German Anazagasty-Rodriguez, Cpl James D. Barrone, Cpl Daniel J. Bogan, Cpl Arthur Brumagen, PFC William J. Burrey, Cpl Warren E. Castleberry, Cpl Leonard B. Davisson, PFC Dennis D. Dooley, 2dLt William C. Drumright, Cpl William A. Butremaine, PFC John A. Gladu, PFC Rodney C. Guidry, SSgt John E. Hoffman, Maj George E. Jenkins, 2dLt William K. Joyce.

2dLt Robert T. Kennelly, 2dLt George C. Lee, Jr., Sgt Billie W. Lynch, PFC Homer J. Mull, MSgt Steve Nemits, Sgt Robert H. Pierce, PFC Herman J. Pizzi, 2dLt Stanley H. Rauh, Sgt Robert J. Rawlins, SSgt Staleo Salmona, PFC Clyde J. Steel, PFC Billie R. Troutman, 2dLt Emile A. Walker, PFC Jackson B. Walls, TSgt Robert White, Sgt Stanley O. Woodyard.

Legion of Merit

LtCol Anthony Caputo, Col Robert W. Clark, Col John P. Condon (3d), Col Jack R. Cram, LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr., MajGen Clayton C. Jerome (2d), LtCol Glenn R. Long, Maj Stanley N. McLeod, LtCol William D. Patterson, Jr., LtCol David S. Randall, Col Douglas E. Reeves (2d), LtCol Charles O. Rogers, LtCol Robert H. Thomas, LtCol Charles E. Warren, Col Hawley C. Waterman.

Distinguished Flying Cross

Maj Charles H. Church, Jr., (4th), Col John P. Condon, 1stLt Joseph A. Corvi, MSgt Dan R. George, Capt George H. Green, Jr., Maj Francis C. Jennings (5th), Maj Harold P. Logan (3d), 1stLt James G. Martz III, Maj J. B. McCullough, Jr. (2d), Capt Arthur J. McDonald, Maj Richard McMahon (3d). 1stLt Russell M. McNutt, Capt John W. Norlin, 2dLt Arthur S. Ohlgren, Capt Richard L. Peck, 2dLt Hugo A. Raccuia, Jr., Maj Milford V. Seaman, Capt Bert E. Shumate, Maj William T. Stratton (3d), Capt John S. Thompson, Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr., 1stLt Ralph D. Wallace, Capt Richard L. Watson (2d).

Bronze Star

PFC Eugene W. Albright, Sgt Harold D. Amen, PFC Charles F. Anderson, PFC John T. Angle, Jr., Maj William E. Antley, Jr., LtCol Gerard T. Armitage, Sgt Charles E. Arnold, Capt Douglas S. Ashton, PFC Jamon K. Baker, Cpl Joseph F. Barboline, CWO Mark W. Billings, 1stLt John F. Blandy, Sgt

John M. Blankenship, Maj David A. Brewster, MSgt Earl R. Brown, 1stLt Clement C. Buckley, PFC Domonic M. Bulgarella.

Maj John D. Cannon, 2dLt William F. Capper, 1stLt Norbert D. Carlson, Cpl Norman E. Carsey, TSgt Melvin H. Castor, Maj Theodore R. Cathey, Sgt Manuel B. Cerda, Maj Wesley R. Christie, Capt Henry J. Christman, Sgt Dominic A. Cisco, PFC A. C. Clark, LtCol Finley T. Clarke, Jr., Maj Howard E. Cook, Capt Alfred M. Cordes, Cpl Clyde M. Cox, LtCol Philip L. Crawford, MSgt James J. Creek, PFC Robert L. Crowe.

TSgt Donald E. Culp, Cpl James K. Damon, Cpl Wayne O. Danielsen, LtCol George W. E. Daughtry, TSgt Harvey A. Davis, TSgt William I. Davis (2d), TSgt Wayne R. Dearth, PFC Peter L. DeRespiris, Cpl Amor P. Ditter, PFC Robert I. Dodge, SSgt James T. Donlan, PFC Jack W. Doran, MSgt Herschel D. Dorsett, 2dLt James E. Douglas, Sgt Robert E. Doyle, Capt Sam A. Dressin, LtCol Frank C. Drury, 2dLt John F. Duff.

Cpl David J. Dunham, PFC James M. Eakman, Jr., TSgt Robert S. Eddy, Cpl James A. Edwards, Cpl Richard L. Erickson, Sgt Daniel W. Evans, Jr., SSgt David R. Evans (2d), Cpl Richard Feldmann, SSgt Donald L. Fingerhut, PFC Joseph R. Fonte, PFC Robert G. Frohn, 1stLt Warren C. Gonnason, Cpl Robert G. Greeley, PFC William F. Greene, LtCol Noel C. Gregory, 2dLt Robert E. Haebele, PFC Garnard E. Harold, Maj Edwin A. Harper.

Maj Alexander M. Hearn, MSgt George D. Henwood, Capt Gilbert R. Hershey, 2dLt Peter L. Hilgartner, CWO Howard Holden, Capt Gifford S. Horton, Maj Robert G. Howie, SSgt Harold D. Hughes, Sgt Albert L. Ireland, Maj Charles J. Irwin, Cpl Donald E. Jennings, 2dLt Chester T. Jones, 2dLt Charles M. C. Jones, Jr., 2dLt William K. Joyce, Sgt Kale Kalustian (2d), 2dLt Thomas F. Kelsh, 2dLt Donald A. Kenmonth.

2dLt William J. Knight, Jr., Cpl Eugene Kuykendoll, SSgt Gerald G. LaDue, PFC Joseph M. Lamberto, 2dLt Vito B. LaSala, Capt John H. Lauck, PFC Wiley J. Ledet, Cpl Peter Lemay, 1stLt Cecil P. Lewis, Cpl Frederick A. Libby, 2dLt Donald L. Lindemann, Maj Warren F. Lloyd (2d), Maj Oscar M. Lofstrom, Cpl Jose G. Lopez, Sgt James J. Lynch, Sgt John W. Mann, Sgt Albert A. Marshall, Sgt James J. Martindale.

SSgt William L. Mason, PFC Willie T. Mathis, PFC Dock W. McDowell, Cpl Thomas E. McFadden, Sgt John A. McIsaac, 2dLt John G. Metz, PFC Henry L. Metzler, 2dLt Samuel T. Milliken, Jr., Capt Clarence G. Moody, Jr., Cpl John B. Moore, PFC James A. Morgan (2d), Sgt Richard A. Mullin, 1stLt Stewart A. Munroe, Jr., Capt John J. Murphy, SSgt Raymond W. Musselwhite, Cpl Eugene Nelson, Capt Joseph A. Nelson.

PFC Robert J. Okerman, PFC John J. O'Riordan, SSgt Joseph S. Osiecznek, LtCol John H. Papurca, Sgt Vernon A. Paulson, 2dLt Frank G. Perrin, Maj Theodore A. Petras, Cpl Martin H. Petkovsek, Capt Jay V. Poage, Pvt Alvin C. Pope, PFC Keith M. Porter, PFC George F. Provost, 2dLt James W. Ratigan, PFC Dale E. Richardson, Maj Ralph C. Rosacker (2d), Cpl Bonnie E. Ross, PFC Frank J. Russo.

Cpl Franklin D. Santo, PFC Joseph E. Schilling, PFC Orland G. Schuft, Cpl William S. Scott, Maj Milford V. Seaman, PFC Francis E. Searles, SSgt Richard T. Segich, PFC Philip T. Seney, CWO Eugene E. Seyer, Capt Lemuel C. Shepherd III, 1stLt Nicholas J. Sheppard, PFC Kenna E. Shields, Cpl Donald F. Shott, Capt Anthony J. Stotnicki, 2dLt Darrell O. Smith, SSgt Everett S. Smith, Maj Richard B. Smith.

Sgt Don T. Snyder, Capt Charles A. Sooter, 2dLt William C. Splees, SSgt Sherman L. Staggs, Cpl James L. Stahl, MSgt Julius B. Starr, 1stLt David J. Straus, Capt Kenneth F. Swiger, Cpl James K. Temple, SSgt Walter L. Terrell, Cpl Homer M. Toon, 1stLt Rodolfo L. Trevino, 2dLt Charles S. Trotter, Cpl John P. Trucano, Maj James W. Tuma, PFC Richard F. Turpin, 2dLt Richard A. Vanderclute, PFC Arthur Vega, 2dLt Vernon K. Vick.

PFC William Vigil, Jr., Cpl Henry P. Volkman, Jr., PFC Norbert L. Von Osten, PFC Clair A. Vroman, Cpl Robert M. Walker, TSgt Lyndolph Ward, LtCol Charles E. Warren (3d), PFC Troy S. Watson, Capt William P. Whitbeck, Cpl Donald P. Willet, PFC Millard Williams, SSgt Ray L. Williams, 2dLt Richard L. Williams, PFC John W. Wishart, PFC David M. Woodward, Sgt Jimmie D. Young, Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow.



WE STALK THE ENEMY



By Cpl Paul G. Martin

■ ABOARD THE SUBMARINE YOU ARE briefed yet another time on the enemy, the terrain, and your mission. One final check is made for loose buckles, chains, or straps capable of making noise at the wrong time, and then faces are blackened.

The sub surfaces, and the sailors go up deck and get the rubber boats ready for the boat teams. The troops man the boats, paddle away, and assemble at a safe distance, and the CO gives a final briefing as the submarine submerges.

The boats maneuver into position and head for the surf line. At the surf, two strong swimmers strike out for the beach and check the immediate area for a good landing spot. If all is clear, they signal a boat team in. The first group lands, conceals its boat, and sets up security for the rest of the party. After the main body is landed, all boats are concealed and the entire party is oriented. You begin your mission, and you're on your own in enemy territory for the next twenty-four hours.

I have served with reconnaissance companies in the U. S. and Korea, and have made many missions like the one just described. I liked the duty, and since I have found that very few Marines know what Recon duty is all about, I thought this article might



Here's Recon—the tough, hard-working Marine company that has earned the right to be called 'eyes and ears of the division'



clear up a few misconceptions and bring some credit to a hard-working, well-trained group of professional Marines.

First, let's go into a little history of reconnaissance outfits to give some idea of their scope and capabilities. This will be a combination of my own experiences, and what a World War II officer told me.

Amphibious scouting first was tried out in the middle '30s during Caribbean maneuvers. Seven Marines climbed into an LCR (rubber boat), paddled in through heavy surf during the black of night, and landed on an Aggressor beach. They spent the next day observing the "enemy" and

returned with information necessary to prepare a successful landing. This was the origin of amphibious scouting. The technique was expanded and improved prior to World War II.

During World War II, the amphibious reconnaissance units proved their worth in the Pacific. It would be impossible to give a complete history of their exploits, as I do not have the space nor access to accurate records, but here are a few of their missions.

In the Gilberts, one unit went in, reconnoitered the ground for eight days, and then guided the elements of the main landing force.

During the Marshalls, Marianas, and Iwo Jima campaigns, they searched and covered nearby islands which might have been hazards to the main landings.

In the Philippines, a Recon outfit spent thirty-eight days behind enemy lines obtaining information.

When the Korean situation developed, and the 1st Marine Division was committed, the Recon company of the division was changed from an amphibious element of nine-man boat teams to a motorized unit of four-man jeep teams. Although part of the Recon company made scouting raids along the Korean coast, the majority of the missions assigned were inland.

Starting at Inchon, Recon was very busy the first three days screening the division's right flank and searching the hills and towns for possible partisans and enemy stragglers. By September 19, the division was ready to cross the Han River and Recon was given the honor of being the first to cross. The plan was as follows:


At dusk a thirteen-man swimming team was to cross and check the enemy shoreline, then the balance of the company would rush through in LVTs to block the enemy communication route running southeast to Seoul — this would cover the main assault.

The swimmers made it across, but

the civilians and worked to release natives imprisoned by Communists.

From Seoul, the company went first to Wonsan and then, after drawing cold weather gear, led the forward echelon of the division to Hungnam. It was at this point we employed our first motorized patrol. The plan was to scout to Huksu-ri, an enemy supply depot about forty miles away.

As we went through each town on the route, the natives reported straggling enemy soldiers moving at night. When we reached the foot of the mountain pass, a native reported there were 4,000 Reds in the town ahead. We pushed forward anyway, but didn't see a single Red when we



The Han—Recon crossed it first

reached the town. We made contact with the enemy at Sudong-ni and captured Chinese prisoners who reported that their main force was at Chinhung-ni.

At the outskirts of Chinhung-ni we got out of our jeeps and a patrol went ahead on foot and entered the town. Two T-34 tanks were spotted and two scouting teams moved in on them with grenades. Suddenly enemy troops broke cover and charged the scouting




They move fast and range far with their motorized patrols

the enemy put up heavy resistance when the LVTs moved out. The main body wanted to continue on through, but it received orders to pick up the swimmers and report back with the information already obtained. The unit retired but the operation made the enemy reveal all of his defensive positions. Supporting fire did the rest, and the crossing was made successfully.

While the battle for Seoul went on, the Reconnaissance Company continued screening the flanks and gaps in the line. With the main fighting for the city over, Recon continued searching for enemy stragglers among

went through the town. It was dark when we arrived at the top of the pass, so we assembled our jeeps and formed a perimeter guard. Five North Koreans hit our lines during the night but none got through. The next day we moved on, finally contacting the enemy outside Huksu-ri. After making contact, we broke off and headed back to Hungnam with our information. We hadn't suffered a single casualty.

On returning to the division CP, the company was dispatched to join the 7th Marines who were pushing toward the Chosin Reservoir. On our first reconnaissance for the 7th Ma-





Hill 884—they made a switch to helicopters

meals when the job is finished



teams, but we covered with fire, and our scouts destroyed both tanks. After this action we made a few flank patrols for the 7th Marines and then returned to division.

On 27 November, the company was ordered to Yudam-ni, but upon arrival at Koto-ri, roadblocks were reported in front of us. Col (now Brig-Gen) Puller, who was CO of the 1st Marines at the time, needed us to tie in with his 2d Battalion and strengthen the Koto-ri strongpoint. When ordered to withdraw from Koto-ri, Recon company took the rear guard position with B Company, 1st Tank Battalion, and fought through to Hungnam.

Recon again saw action in January 1951, searching for guerrillas in the Andong area. Every day our motorized patrols ran into roadblocks, and once engaged a large group of guerrillas. This was all good training for new men who knew little about motorized reconnaissance.

During "Operation Killer," the Re-

con company continued to patrol, and during the spring counter-offensive we made motorized patrols into Chun-chon and along the communication route to Seoul. On one occasion, we stayed concealed in a town for two nights tracing enemy cavalry and infantry patrols, and ended up by directing air strikes on them.

In the fall of 1951 when the division was committed in the Punchbowl area, Recon took part in the assault on Hill 812, and then participated in the first helicopter assault landing in history. This event took place on Hill 884.

That is about as much of Recon's activities in Korea that I'm sure about. I understand that the company is still fulfilling its mission by constant patrolling forward of the lines.

The account I have just given admittedly is not all-inclusive. However, it was only intended to point out the varied missions of a reconnaissance company. Now I'll give you some information on Recon's organization, mission, and tactics.



Recon company is normally under divisional control, with administration handled by headquarters battalion. The company headquarters includes a major as commanding officer, a captain for executive officer, and a third officer who acts as a combined operations and intelligence officer. He also handles liaison with higher echelons.

The company has its own communications section and motor transport section, complete with mechanics and facilities for minor vehicle repair and maintenance.

Arms for the troops include M-1 and '03 rifles, BARs, and light machine guns. On motorized patrols, the company may carry along all its weapons and, if a rough job is in sight, may be supported by mortar sections, tanks, and planes.

THE PRIMARY MISSION of Recon is a very important one. We know that before a commander can direct his unit in combat, he must know the enemy situation which is compiled by the intelligence sections (S-2, G-2). The intelligence sections have six sources of information:

- (1) Prisoners of war
- (2) Captured documents
- (3) Aerial photographs
- (4) Adjacent and higher units
- (5) Frontline troops and scouts
- (6) Natives

Information gathered from natives, prisoners, and captured documents is not too reliable. Aerial photos help, but are not all-inclusive, and information from adjacent units and higher echelons is not always received in time. Therefore the scouts of Recon are a most important source of information.

Amphibious patrols may be ordered to check the beachline and the immediate area behind it for good landing spots for troops and equipment, and to check key terrain positions commanding the beach and make note of the strength and activities of the enemy defending these points. Their mission may also include checking communication routes for movement of enemy troops and equipment and the condition of the roads. If the natives are friendly, pa-

trols may question them as to quantity and disposition of troops.

Foot patrols may be used to search hilly areas for enemy stragglers, to capture prisoners, and to locate enemy positions and bring back reports on their strength and disposition.

Motorized patrols are used when large areas are to be reconnoitered or when speed is necessary. In a rapid advance they may be used to keep contact with the enemy and report his position.

To operate efficiently, a good reconnaissance company needs professionally trained fighting men who are physically fit. Men who are assigned to a Recon company receive training in hand-to-hand combat, compass and map reading, the use of message books, creeping and crawling, cover and concealment, moving small boats through the surf, small-unit tactics, and how to report what they see.

From experience gained with a Recon company on maneuvers in the States and in combat in Korea, I have a few comments and recommendations to make regarding the present set-up.

I feel that men selected for duty with a Recon outfit should be carefully screened to insure they are in top physical condition and have excellent vision and hearing. Most important, all men assigned should be good swimmers.

A Recon company should be prepared for, and equipped for, any type of work. (At Inchon and Seoul we would have been more effective if we had had jeeps and rubber boats.)

Reconnaissance patrols should be kept small in size, as large patrols are easily spotted by the enemy. Foot patrols should travel light and the men should carry only personal weapons. I do not believe a foot patrol should be equipped with machine guns. Crew-served weapons only serve to make a reconnaissance patrol unwieldy and slow, and BARs can furnish all the firepower necessary. BAR-men should never be with the point. They should be placed in the middle or the rear of the patrol so they can maneuver easily in case of trouble.

Commanding officers and operations and intelligence officers should be fully instructed as to the functions

of a Recon outfit. A CO should think twice before he sends out a Recon patrol, because there are times when a patrol may do more harm than good. For example, a patrol may cause an enemy to be alerted for a general attack.

All units, including artillery and air, should be notified when and where a patrol is operating.

Great care should be used in evaluating information picked up from natives. They don't know much about military terms and are likely to report four men as a regiment or 2,000 men as a squad. Talk in numbers rather than in units when questioning them.

All in all, I found it good duty with Recon company. Many men have asked me how rough it was. I'd say not nearly as rough as regular duty with a line outfit. Briefly, a rifle company must face the enemy in combat and is in a danger area longer. Recon's mission is to obtain information and get back with the dope; therefore, we remain concealed from the enemy and rarely fire except in self-defense. Rifle companies live on "C" rations most of the time and live out with little protection from the weather, whereas Recon goes back to warm tents and hot meals when the job is finished.

There have been many questions about the chances of being caught by the enemy in this type of work. The possibilities are very small. Put yourself in the place of a sentry on the beach in the opening of this article. If you had been doing sentry duty, or had been on watch for weeks in a quiet spot, what would be your reaction if you suddenly bumped into an enemy? Think it over, and especially remember the enemy you bump into is loaded for bear and on the lookout for trouble. In addition, he is well trained in hand-to-hand and unarmed combat. Do you think you would have much chance of taking him prisoner?

Serving with a Recon outfit is a rewarding experience. There is variety of duty, and it is work that brings all the senses and faculties into play. You serve with a unit that is the eyes and ears of the division, where morale is high, and men are respected as the core of an elite Corps. USMC



You need no weapons, sand tables, or maneuver areas to pick up this vital military specialty



Speak the Language

THE TURMOIL OF POLITICAL AND racial difficulties that beset the world today should raise in the minds of every Marine, active or reserve, the question, "How can I help?" This is the story of how one group of Marines has answered that question.

Disparity of language is historically one of the most insurmountable obstacles to the peace of the world and the mutual understanding and security of its inhabitants. A universal tongue would, no doubt, have fore stalled much friction among nations in the past, but it is unlikely that we will see the development of such a tongue in our times. Therefore, we must do the next best thing and learn to speak the languages of most of the peoples with whom we may come in contact.

Obviously, this is an impossibility for any but the most gifted of scholars, and men with such linguistic capabilities are very few. But, if the problem is analyzed and its solutions made the responsibility of many men, the problem becomes much less complex and more readily dealt with by men of ordinary intelligence. This is especially true if these men are interested in improving their own knowledge while rendering extremely valuable service to the Marine Corps at little personal sacrifice.

Since the Marine Corps may be called upon at any time to serve in any part of the world, it is important

By 1st Lt Douglas J. Macdonald





that it find in its own ranks men familiar with all major languages. Then it will not have to rely on the services of interpreters whose understanding of the particular military problem is slight, or whose status does not allow military or political responsibility to be placed in their hands.

The value of such interpreters can be seen easily, whether they serve as staff personnel on a peacetime legation guard, or have to question a captured enemy as to the nature of the situation just over the hill. Training films on intelligence methods stress the importance of speaking the language of an enemy, thereby gaining his confidence and increasing his value as a source of combat information. This is undeniable. Also the cause of peacetime service will be helped by one's ability to converse freely with people of other countries.

Fortunately, it will not be difficult to find persons with a working knowledge of the important European languages, because of the European-born citizens in our country whose sons have learned a foreign tongue at home, or who have studied a language as part of their high school or college education. However, there are not many Marines who are familiar with Russian, Arabic, Hindustani, Chinese, Japanese, or the diverse tongues spoken throughout the Near and Far

East. While it is true that one usually can find someone who speaks English anywhere in the world, it is not always convenient to hunt up the educated citizen to help out, especially on a military operation. Such an operation would go far more smoothly if, wherever we go, we can take with us our own interpreters who are able to converse with the local population.

At first glance, the difficulties surrounding such a project may seem virtually insurmountable, especially in the case of languages that do not share our alphabet. One may ask, "Where do we get the money, the schools, and the teachers to initiate and carry on such a program?" During World War II, the Marine Corps conducted schools for the study of Japanese with considerable success,

and at present provides correspondence courses in several languages through the Marine Corps Institute. However, we do not have the facilities for a comprehensive coverage of the "key" tongues.

• THEREFORE, IT BECOMES the responsibility of interested Marines, of all ranks, not presently engaged in active military affairs, to see what can be done to arrive at a speedy and thorough solution to this problem. The problem may well be answered by forming a nucleus of trained interpreters, around whom a more active program may be built should the necessity arise. A practical start has already been made on the west coast, and it is proving that, with capable leadership and encouragement from the Marine Corps, an interested group can overcome the apparent difficulties of learning to speak, read, and write a foreign language.

In July of 1952, Major A. Zielinski placed a notice in the 11th Marine Corps Reserve District publication stating that he wanted to form a Volunteer Reserve training unit for the purpose of learning the Russian language. The response was instantaneous and enthusiastic.

Maj Zielinski, realizing that existing Marine Corps appropriations would not be available to support



such a plan, contacted the director of the Los Angeles Adult Education Program and was told that, if he could obtain a minimum enrollment of twenty persons, the school system would pay the instructor's wages and provide classroom facilities for as many nights a week as the group desired. At a dinner meeting, the place and hours of instruction were decided upon. Maj Zielinski had already been fortunate in locating an excellent teacher, a man young enough to be patient with adult pupils long out of touch with the demands of formal education techniques, yet who, by nature of his background as a soldier in the Russian Army, a member of the Ukrainian partisans, and a student of Slavic languages and history, had the necessary qualifications for conducting a language class with military overtones.

The men in the training unit decided to concentrate first on speaking the language, and then reading and writing it. However, it quickly became apparent that it was impractical to separate the phases, so they were undertaken simultaneously.

Various texts and training recordings have been made available by Headquarters Marine Corps, and some members have privately purchased an excellent text on Russian. In addition to the "live" course, most of the members of the class have also enrolled in the Marine Corps Institute's correspondence course in Russian, realizing that they must attack the problem from as many directions as possible. Training films have been made available, and a program of speakers, mainly specialists in intelligence procedures, is being arranged. The class, now that it knows the job can be done, is seeking reclassification from its "general" to a "research" rating to specialize in intelligence functions.

Already, members are capable to varying degrees of speaking, reading, and writing a limited amount of Russian. Their progress thus far is due to the capable instructor and their individual enthusiasm for the project. And although there is plenty of joking about finally finding out "what they say in the Russian Marine Corps," the realization of the serious

import of the instruction underlies every meeting.

The reserves must come forward, as only they have the time and also the access to the necessary facilities for forming an entirely new and valuable addition to the Corps, a language pool that eventually will enable the Marines to operate more ef-



ficiently and effectively in any major country in the world.

Units may be formed in various parts of the United States to specialize in whatever tongue suits the interest of the group, because the wider the assortment of languages under study the better for the future of the program. Many major cities have fully-developed adult education programs, facilities of which can be made available to Marine reserves. The solution to the teacher problem may not always be as easy as the Los Angeles group found it, but government agencies, the State Department, colleges, businesses that operate on a global scale, and perhaps religious groups that conduct missionary activities can advise and assist in locating persons qualified to conduct a class in the study of a foreign tongue.

Several things are important to the success of such a unit. The members must first be enthusiastically interested. Learning a new language is not a simple thing, but an active desire to learn will help make molehills out of the grammatical mountains. A small committee should be formed to assess the aims of the class and, with the cooperation of the instructor, to see that they are met. Frequent review and re-statement gives direction and purpose to what can easily become a long, drawn-out process. The Marine Corps does not need linguis-

tic scholars, but rather men with a basic working knowledge of foreign languages who have the backgrounds and ability to coordinate these languages with their military training.

To add interest to the course, each member may undertake the study of a particular phase of the country whose language he is learning, and, through outside investigation, become an expert in his particular specialty. One need only to study the preparations made for the invasion of Europe in World War II to realize the importance of a complete knowledge of a country to the successful conduct of an operation within its boundaries. Many of the important countries of the world are divided into various sections—such as the various states in the Soviet Republic. Each member of a group could pick



one such section or state and study its people and their habits and customs, its lines of communication, geography, resources, natural obstacles, or economic and agricultural centers. He then would be of inestimable value in the later training of enough Marines to enable every regiment involved in peaceful or military operations to have at least one member completely familiar with the local situation.

Should the need arise, formal Marine Corps language classes can be built around such a nucleus of trained or partially-trained linguists much more speedily than if no such trained personnel existed. Perhaps such plans seem ambitious, but they are not impossible, as the Los Angeles program is currently proving.

The need is evident, the resources are available, and most certainly the time is NOW!

USMC

By 2dLt Frank E. Copeland

"CAPTAIN, THIS IS MY SON, BILL. He picked up some information on one of your Marine officer programs when he registered at school, but he didn't get all the facts. I was wondering if you might help us out with more information."

Joe Wilson, the captain, laid aside the nine-iron he had been using to practice chip shots on the front lawn and went over to where his neighbor, Clint Dorn, was standing with his son.

"Glad to know you, Bill," the captain said, shaking hands. "Come up on the porch where we can be comfortable and I'll give you all the information I can. I'm not a regular procurement officer, but I have most of the facts and what I don't know I'll try to find out for you."

While Clint, his son, and the captain are making themselves comfortable on the porch, let's pause a moment in retrospect. Of course, the situation described above may never happen to you. In the first place, you may not be a captain. Second, perhaps you don't play golf. Third, you might live next to a gas station, with the Smiths occupying the house on the other side. Thus you wouldn't have a neighbor, Clint Dorn, with a son named Bill. The situation just doesn't fit you.

So suppose you shrug it off, grab the old fly rod and head for the upper pond where you heard the trout were rising—that's where it happens to you. Just as you're tying on the first fly, up walks Carl Schroeder. (Carl owns the gas station next door to you.) With Carl is a six-footer who looks as though he could carry Carl under one arm.

"This is Junior," says Carl. "During spring football practice he picked up some information on one of your Marine officer programs, but he didn't get all the facts. I was wondering if you might help him out?"

Well, there you are. Face it. The question may be posed to you any place or at any time. Put away that fly rod and get back up on the porch where it's comfortable. If you listen in on the conversation you'll know what it's all about, and you'll be able



ANSWER THEIR QUESTIONS



to give intelligent answers when the questions are put to you.

Listen. Bill Dorn, the son, is speaking.

"At college, Captain, I've heard some of the seniors talking about entering an Officers' Candidate Course after graduation. Do you have a different program for undergraduates?"

Platoon Leaders' Class Program

"We sure do, Bill, and that program is called the Platoon Leaders' Class. Briefly, it consists of two separate six-week courses of training at Quantico, Virginia, during your undergraduate years. I might add that it doesn't interrupt your academic work in any way. In other words, there are no drills during the week or on weekends. Upon successful completion of these periods of training, and graduation from college, you are commissioned a second lieutenant and retained on active duty with the Corps for two years."

"It sounds like a decent deal, Captain, but I don't think Dad can afford to pay my way to Quantico for this training."

"He's right," said Clint breaking in. "In fact, although the business did show a slight profit last month, I had to show it in red ink. If I had bought a bottle of blue ink there wouldn't have been any profit."

"Well, don't worry about that," chuckled the captain. "You won't have to pay his transportation. The Marine Corps pays his way to Quantico, feeds, clothes, and houses him while he's there, and pays his way home. Actually, Bill, you attend the junior course of the Platoon Leaders' Class as a corporal and will net about \$150 for your first summer's training. You are automatically promoted to sergeant for the senior course, and

you'll clear around \$185 for that summer."

"I'll buy that deal about strictly summer training, Captain, with no interference during the academic year, but it's costing me plenty to keep Bill in college. What if he gets drafted between now and the time he gets his commission in the Marine Corps?"

UMT Outlined

"The Universal Military Service and Training Act of 1951," continued the captain, "says that members of the Marine Corps' Platoon Leaders' Class are eligible for deferment from Selective Service. If Bill qualifies for PLC, he will be deferred immediately and will then occupy a 1-D slot in the draft set-up. Incidentally, that's the same classification enjoyed by a cadet at West Point or a midshipman at the Naval Academy. We're not selling draft deferment as an inducement to join the program, Clint. However, with the ever-increasing demands for manpower, it's certainly important to

know that our program does offer your son a chance to complete his college training without interruption from the military. Of course, Bill could lose that deferment in several ways. First of all, if he fails to come up to Marine Corps standards at Quantico and flunks out, he would be dropped from the program. Or, if he doesn't maintain a normal average at college or drops out entirely, he would no longer be eligible for PLC and his deferment."

Bill mulled the information over in his mind for a moment.

"Well," he asked, "in either of the cases you mentioned, what would happen to me?"

"Nothing out of the ordinary. You could become an inactive member of the Marine Corps Reserve, or you could volunteer for two years' active duty as an enlisted man."

"If I became an inactive member of the Reserve would I be deferred from the draft?"

"No more or no less than any oth-

WHEN how
should I ? where
will WHAT

Prompt and honest replies to queries on UMT and officer training

programs can bring us the officers we need. Be ready with the answers

er college student. In such a category you could be drafted right out of the Marine Corps Reserve. Now, if you had completed both six-week summer training courses, and volunteered for active duty as an enlisted man you would come to duty as a corporal. In any case, if you do flunk out, the Marine Corps will allow you to make your own decision."

"You mentioned flunking out by not coming up to Marine Corps standards, Captain. Just how rough is this training?"

"As it happens, Bill, I came into the Marine Corps through the PLC program just six years ago. I didn't come into the Corps as a mental genius or a physical giant; the Marine Corps doesn't expect to receive their candidates tailor-made. The Corps wants normal, healthy college men who are not allergic to hard work. They expect an honest effort in return for the leadership training given.

"In addition let me say that the PLC is not designed for veterans of World War II or Korea. It is slanted toward men who haven't had any military training. Your instructors will operate on the premise that you know nothing about the military. Naturally, previous military training would give you a big assist, but it certainly isn't necessary. When you report for duty at Quantico, the Marine Corps has an investment in you. They try to make you succeed, not fail."

Summer Training

"Well that's good to hear, Captain, but what is this training like? Is it anything like the Boot Camp we hear so much about?"

"Well, Bill, it differs from Boot Camp at recruit depots. I don't mean to say you won't be subject to discipline during your training. You will, definitely. Also, some of the subjects you'll take during your summer training will be similar to recruit training . . . subjects like troop and drill, Marine Corps customs and courtesies, the M-1 rifle, squad tactics, map reading, first aid, and related subjects.

"During the second summer's course, you will go on to more advanced subjects and training. You will study crew-served weapons such as mortars and heavy machine guns, and you will



learn more about tactics. In a nutshell, this training is aimed at providing the leadership development and military instruction necessary to prepare you for appointment to commissioned rank."

Officer Candidates' Course

"Excuse me, Captain. I see Jim Kearns over there. Mind if I bring him over? He's a senior in college and I know he'd like to get some information on your programs."

"It looks like my audience is increasing," said the captain as Jim Kearns came up on the porch. "Are you looking for information on officer programs, too, Jim?"

"I sure am, Captain. I graduate in June and I was wondering if I could get a commission in the Marine Corps by virtue of having a degree?"

"The degree will help you Jim—that is if it isn't in medicine, dentistry, or theology—but there's a lot of hard work connected with it."

"I know that. I'm not looking for a commission on a silver platter, but my student deferment runs out in July or August and I doubt whether my draft board will hold out much longer. I know I'm going to have to go in some service, and I'd prefer to get the jump on them and pick my own."

"At least you've got your feet on the ground, Jim. I think you're right about going into service this summer. There seems to be a definite shortage of manpower when it comes to men of military age, and I've heard several explanations for the situation as it exists."

"First of all, most men of your age group were born during the depression years. Most parents just couldn't afford to have large families, and, consequently, we start right off in the military manpower picture with a

smaller-than-average group of eligible young men.

"Secondly, veterans of World War II are not eligible for the draft, and the first draftees of the Korean emergency started to receive discharges in July of 1952. Combine those factors with the fact that a couple of hundred thousand students are getting military deferments under ROTC, NROTC, AFROTC, and approximately an equal number getting college deferments, and you can begin to understand why draft boards must dip into the nineteen-year-old bracket in some parts of the country right now."

"I guess that explains why some of my friends were pulled out of college last year, but aside from that, Captain, I thought you were going to tell me about the Officer Candidates' Course. What's the story on that?"

From Pfc to Lieutenant

"I guess I did get off the track for a minute, Jim. You wanted to know about OCC, didn't you? Well, in short, it consists of an intensive ten-week course at Quantico. After completing the course successfully, you are sworn in as a second lieutenant."

"You mean to tell me that after I get my degree that I could qualify for a commission in just ten weeks. Come on now, what's the catch?"

"There's no 'catch' to it. If you successfully complete the training course, Jim, you get your gold bars. And Bill, if you enroll in the PLC you receive your commission just as soon as you get your degree; provided, of course, in the meantime you have successfully completed your two six-week training periods."

"Certainly neither of you will have proven that you are a military genius by completing those primary courses. However, you will have indicated that you are up to standard, and the Corps will give you its vote of confidence by awarding you your commission."

"You mean after we get our commissions, that's all there is to it? How can we be ready to lead anyone with that kind of a background?"

Special Basic Course

"Well, with that kind of background you might lead them into

trouble, but the Marine Corps doesn't permit you to lead men as soon as you are commissioned. In the first place, it wouldn't be fair to the enlisted men under you, and, in the second place, it would be unfair to you.

"No, you won't lead any men as soon as you get your commission. First, you'll go to Basic School at Quantico for a comprehensive officer training course. Only after that will you be expected to perform duty with troops."

"What is the course like, Captain?"

"Well, Bill, the course consists of basic indoctrination in every field you will be required to be familiar with as a new officer, and that means essentially as an infantry leader."

"Does that mean that every new officer coming into the Marine Corps goes into the infantry?"

"No, it doesn't. In addition to the infantry the Marine Corps has its own tanks, artillery, supply, motor transport, communications, and many other units organic to the structure of the Corps, and, of course, they need new officers in these fields also. But let me tell you this right now: If the prospect of leading an infantry platoon is repugnant to you, don't join the Corps."

"Now, back to Basic School. In addition to the field work you will accomplish, the five-month course includes over 400 classroom hours. You will accomplish your theoretical work in the classroom and then go into the field and work it out practically."

"I've put a lot of emphasis on every new officer being an infantry leader because the Marine Corps operates on that premise, but sometime before you graduate from Basic School you will be allowed to list your first three choices of duty."

"What governs the selections for specialist jobs, Captain?"

• "THERE ARE MANY things taken into consideration, Bill—the needs of the Marine Corps at the time you graduate, or your academic background, for instance. In addition, the screening and recommendations of your training officers, and an evaluation of your capabilities and aptitudes as evinced by comprehensive tests will be considered along with your duty preference before you are assigned.

"You may apply for one of some sixteen schools after your basic course, such schools as the Naval Flight Training School at Pensacola, the Armored Officers' Course at Fort Knox, and the Communication Officers' Course at Quantico. With the exception of flight school, these courses average about three months each."

Obligated Service

"That about wraps it up for me, Captain, with the exception of one thing—what's the obligated service under these programs?"

"We require that you serve on active duty as a commissioned officer for two years, Jim, and remain in the inactive reserve for six years thereafter. It's the same for all services. The Universal Military Service and Training Act says that every male American between the ages of eighteen-and-one

starts the day your bars are pinned on. Of course your two six-week courses during the summer don't count, and the ten-week primary course Jim will go through won't count either."

• "THERE'S JUST ONE more thing, Captain. I know Bill is going to go into some service, but it's a father's natural tendency to ask what the score is on the stories we hear about the high casualty rates among Marines in combat."

"Clint, I don't have to tell you that the Marine Corps is a fighting outfit, and that any service suffers casualties in combat. But here's the point—a well-trained organization will suffer fewer casualties than a poorly trained one, and our Marine Corps training is the best that can be given."

"You can't fight battles without taking casualties any more than you can make an omelet without cracking eggs. Personally, I've always considered combat casualties in relation to other things. For example, let's consider the loss of a limb. A man would have to be very seriously wounded to have that happen. During the entire four years of World War II, 21,000 American Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen lost limbs as a result of wounds. Sounds like a lot, doesn't it? But wait a moment. On the comparatively quiet U. S. home front during the same period of time there were 120,000 amputations. Draw your own conclusions."

Enrollment Assistance

"Well, I think you've done a fine job of covering the field for us."

"I'm not too sure that I've covered everything, Jim, but I've done my best. An officer procurement team will probably come to your school one of these days with complete information. Look for announcements in the school paper and in the local newspapers. The teams usually send out announcements weeks in advance of their visit to the schools."

"If you don't want to wait and want some advance information, write to Officer Procurement, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C., and state what program you're interested in. They'll take care of you."

USMC



half and twenty-six will be required to serve for eight years. That law goes on to state that a minimum of two years must be spent on active duty. That would mean, of course, six years in the inactive reserve.

"You know, a lot of men today think that if they wait for the draft to bring them into the service, they will serve their two years and be finished. That is not the case. They will, under the law, become inactive reservists until the eighth anniversary of their induction."

"I take it that my two years of commissioned service would start after Basic School and any other specialized training I might get. Is that right, Captain?"

"No, Bill, you are not right. Your two years of commissioned service



No time for training in Korea? According to this former S-3 officer, training in Korea is second only to fighting

TRAINING, THE CURE-ALL TONIC FOR MILITARY AILMENTS, IS BEING TAKEN in large doses by Marines in Korea. As a matter of fact, so much emphasis is placed on training that the 1st Marine Division is often referred to as "Marine Corps Schools, Korea."

In line with the division training program, 3/7 was scheduled to witness an artillery-firing demonstration one day while the battalion was in division reserve. The demonstration was staged by the general support artillery battalion and it consisted of a skit showing how a fire mission originated, the communication channels it went through, and how it was transferred into firing data.


Finally, while the infantry battalion watched, the mission was actually fired by 155mm and 105mm howitzers. It required great effort on the part of the artillerymen, but the demonstration was excellent training for the infantrymen, many of whom never had seen an artillery piece fired, much less observed the fire-mission procedure.

While the artillerymen were setting up the demonstration in our battalion camp, a lieutenant, who obviously thought this was training emphasis to extremes, quipped "The First Marine Division is going back to the States to make a movie titled, *Fight Hell, We're Training!*"

STATIC WAR

By Maj Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr.





Aggressive Training

The lieutenant was a little off the beam, but not too far. The fact is—fighting is the only thing that takes precedence over training in the 1st Marine Division—a situation that is pleasingly logical.

Marine Corps training in Korea has two vital objectives: to maintain proficiency in the Corps' primary mission—amphibious operations—and to maintain proficiency in defensive and offensive phases of the present land conflict.

Training in amphibious operations was deliberately given precedence, although training in amphibious subjects occupies only a fraction of the total training time. Amphibious training is entitled to priority under the law of the land. Only by continuing this training is it possible for a large unit of the Marine Corps—especially one as large as the 1st Marine Division—to participate in a prolonged land campaign (particularly in a defensive situation) without interfering with the Corps' amphibious capability. The National Security Act authorized employment of the Corps in land campaigns, but only when it doesn't prejudice the capability to wage amphibious war.

On the surface, it is surprising that the second training mission, as listed above, is so essential to combat efficiency on the defensive. Replacements arriving in Korea are already well trained. However, intensified training at every opportunity is necessary to top performance on and forward of the main line of resistance in Korea.

This training commences the moment the replacement sets foot on Korean soil. He is immediately launched into a five-day orientation training period that by division order must be completed before the man may be sent into combat. My observations as S-3 of two different infantry battalions convinced me that there was a definite corollary between training received in reserve and combat performance on the line. Units which missed substantial training, for one reason or another, while the battalion or regiment was in reserve would invariably be sluggish when next in combat. Lack of training showed up in poor control of small units as a result of not properly integrating re-

placements into the small unit team during training. It also resulted in ineffective or improper employment of a particular weapon such as the rifle grenade or .50 cal. machine gun, clumsy use of communication codes, etc. Usually such defects were detected when one company missed training other companies received, and vice versa.

It should come as no surprise that most unit training is aggressively offensive in character. This is obviously necessary in order to keep the division ready for offensive action at all times. The last time I visited the 1st Marine Division's G-3 office a new estimate of the training situation had just been completed. The estimate revealed that one Marine regiment was light in offensive training. The assistant G-3 for training, a lieutenant colonel, had already begun to take remedial action by planning a special training program to implement the training estimate. When this reaches print, that regiment will have long since been brought back up to par in the efficient manner of the 1st Marine Division's training plant.

Training within the division is grouped into four categories: (1) unit-scheduled; (2) school; (3) Marine landing exercise; and (4) on-the-job. "Unit-scheduled" will come in for more detailed explanation than the others, but I will discuss each in its turn.

Unit-scheduled, a term dragged out of thin air, includes all training accomplished within units of the division and governed by a unit training schedule. Normally, units train according to a schedule only when in reserve. Because they are less frequently committed to other missions, units in division reserve are most likely to complete a training phase according to plan. Including time in both regimental and division reserve, a Marine is likely to be training more than half the time he is in Korea.

Units outside infantry regiments, since most of them don't go into reserve status in the same sense that the infantry does, have training schedules that range from elaborate and detailed programs produced by artillery units, to the simplified ones of Combat Service Group. Because of the

demands of on-the-job training, Combat Service Group publishes a brief training schedule that prescribes about four hours weekly training.

On at least one occasion an attempt was made to schedule training for units on the front line, but it met with little success. Of course, it is often necessary to pull men off the MLR for special schooling at battalion level, such as might be needed for familiarization with new equipment. In addition, men from front-line units attend division schools in accordance with prescribed quotas.

For all practical purposes, the basis for unit-scheduled training originates at division. The G-3 maintains a current training order which governs, in a general way, all unit-scheduled training within the division. Of necessity, this directive is affected by higher echelons. For example, Marine Corps General Order 111 is the parent document for supply discipline instructions, while training in the use of passwords and countersigns is based on a corps directive (which, incidentally, prescribes a usage completely foreign to previous Marine Corps training).

Within the framework of the division training directives, the individual regiments issue regimental training orders outlining the regimental training program. These are masterful documents, replete with detail. They run twenty to thirty pages and include at least a dozen enclosures.

They list the purposes of the training program; tell what shall be emphasized; prescribe certain hours to be spent weekly on such subjects as escape and evasion, character guidance, etc.; require a certain percentage of night training; make provisions for establishing certain schools at regimental level; establish arrangements for mine school to be provided by engineers, and forward observer school to be provided by artillery; set forth other subjects that must be covered; and list ammunition allowances, training aids, training film, and so on. The regimental training order also requires that units train a minimum of six hours a day, six days a week, not including two extra hours' school a week for officers and NCOs.

It falls upon the battalion S-3 to take the inanimate training directives and breathe life into the body. He studies, evaluates, and eventually blends the requirements of the higher authority with the needs of the subordinate units into a form that can be understood by everyone in the battalion—a training schedule.

In order to get the best picture of unit-scheduled training, we'll look at the subject through the eyes of the infantry battalion S-3, by-passing the training scheduled for separate companies and battalions. For the remainder of this discussion on unit-scheduled training I'll be drawing on my experience and actually describing training as conducted in the battalion in which I served. However, from conversations with other S-3s, I believe that my training experience was typical.


The battalion S-3 must continually keep his mind attuned to the training situation. He won't last long in the 1st Marine Division if he doesn't. While the battalion is fighting on the MLR, he must be concurrently planning the training that will be executed in reserve. He continually discusses training with the battalion commander and the company commander, with a view of stimulating their thinking along training lines and of noting where they think training emphasis should be placed.

In order to comply with directives that now exist within the division, it is necessary for infantry battalions to submit completed training schedules to regiment twelve days prior to the date training is to commence. It takes the best operations section a couple of days to put a weekly training schedule together after the subjects, training areas, and instructors have been decided on. Obviously the distribution of the schedule demands that it be mechanically reproduced. This is usually done by mimeograph, and must be done at regiment. This means that the battalion S-3 section is typing on a training schedule about fifteen days prior to the date the training will commence. (On several occasions shortage of typewriters forced 2/7's operations section to print schedule stencils with a pencil.) Before the typing can be start-

ed, the S-3 must reconnoiter the training areas (which means that regiment has to provide advance information on just which area the battalion will occupy in reserve), check on range facilities, etc. Another directive requires that training ammunition be requested fifteen days prior to the date it is to be fired. It can readily be seen that the S-3 must constantly project himself into the future in order to keep abreast of the training program. If he slips up on requesting ammunition, let's say, then the whole plan folds up. When moving from a

the training being carried out in Korea is far superior to any they ever observed, be it stateside or where-ever-you. I agree with them. Training is being "spiced up" with a great amount of imagination and at the same time it is being executed more nearly "by the book" than the usual run of training.

Each training period begins with classes on technique of instruction. This schooling is given to all who have been designated as instructors for the training period. They are taught (or review) how to prepare



Before the first shot—five days of orientation

completed training program in reserve to a position on the MLR, an S-3 must take a new training problem right along with him and never cease to plan for the training that will be scheduled when the unit is in reserve again.

The planning for a training period in reserve is completed before the battalion moves off the MLR. The proof of the pudding in this case is, of course, in the execution of the training and the later test when the unit returns to combat. I have heard many old FMF hands comment that

lesson plans and field exercises. For most classes a lesson plan and, when appropriate, a field exercise will be submitted by the instructor for approval before the class is conducted.

Lecture classes are kept to a minimum and are generally of company size. A subject is assigned to an instructor and he gives the instruction to each company of the battalion. Instructors are recommended by company commanders, with final selection being made by S-3.

There are a few visual training aids available for lecture illustration. The



Skull sessions help produce top-flight NCOs for the 1st Mar Div

facilities of the S-3 and S-2 offices are made available for the preparation of additional visual aids. The results are often good, and occasionally would be the envy of a Quantico instructor.

It is required that a great deal of tactical training be conducted during darkness, and that field firing problems with maximum realism be emphasized. In line with this enlightened policy the majority of training problems is field exercises with live firing.

The echelon next above the one conducting the exercise is normally expected to "lay it out." If a company problem is scheduled, the S-3 prepares the field exercise and is designated as the instructor. He then runs the problem with each company in the battalion and personally conducts the critique. If the field exercise is for a platoon, it is the company commander who makes up the problem and acts as instructor. He likewise puts each of his platoons through the same problem.

Being a night combat enthusiast, I always exceeded the required percentage of night training. To do this it was necessary to turn the day half around. The working day began at 1300 and ended at 2400. Men generally liked the revised schedule, especially the late reveille.

Field problems utilize live firing to the maximum extent consistent with the state of training and ammunition availability. Normally, a unit is required to conduct maneuver problems without field firing prior to running similar problems with live ammunition. There are frequent battalion training maneuvers in Korea, and occasionally training maneuvers of regimental size are undertaken. One notable example of the latter was a regimental night attack conducted during training by the 1st Marines. It was executed in such a manner that it could have served as a rehearsal for an attack against a critical terrain feature located in the sector to which the regiment was about to move. However, to the best of my knowledge the company is the largest Marine unit to engage in field firing problems in Korea.

The consensus seems to be that the burdensome safety precautions required for field firing problems of larger than company size, the umpire problem, and excessive ammunition necessary, make it illogical to attempt live firing with battalions. However, there were many day and night attack problems of battalion size, employing Aggressors who fired blanks and illumination. (Battalion night attack problems conducted in Korea also have utilized searchlight tanks.) The S-2 normally controls the Aggressor force for training problems.


Company firing problems are top training exercises in Korea. They act as a sort of "final exam" for most of the training conducted in each reserve period. For some reason, officers and enlisted men seem to evince more interest in company problems than in any others.

A company firing problem is most adaptable to stressing particular areas of training. In a recent company attack problem, emphasis was placed on: (1) use of rifle grenades in the attack; (2) technique of machine gun fire in the attack; (3) technique of mortar fire in the attack; (4) tank-infantry coordination; (5) troop leading steps; and (6) technique of assault on a fortified position. Emphasis was placed on each one of the foregoing phases in the same problem for a definite reason.

A few weeks earlier five men were wounded by a friendly grenade which exploded on the end of a rifle when an attempt was made to fire it. Subsequently, the battalion abruptly stopped using rifle grenades, apparently because of the accident. Grenade firing was therefore emphasized throughout the next training period, and particularly in the company attack problem, to dispel the idea that rifle grenades posed any hazard to the firer. Results were outstanding. When the battalion returned to the line, every squad showed a great respect for the rifle grenade and they were used success-

Enthusiasm runs high when tanks are in the problem





New techniques are worked out—then used

fully almost every time a squad or larger unit made contact of any sort.

While studying amphibious operations, troops were taught that one section of heavy machine guns is "normally" attached to each rifle company, and that pattern of attachment is "normally" followed in actual practice in Korean defensive situations. With a view to preventing Marines from thinking of machine guns in terms of one section of heavies per company and one section of lights per platoon, our company problem stressed the technique of fire of machine guns, utilizing the machine gun platoon of Weapons Company intact to deliver fires in support of the attack. These guns were kept under battalion control to demonstrate that technique, and the problem was designed to emphasize the value of continuous machine-gun fire while the machine-gun platoon is displacing.

• Technique of fire of mortars was stressed in order to provide additional training for forward observers, and to teach troops the necessity for following close under friendly mortar preparation fires in the assault.

Tank-infantry patrols conducted while on the MLR demonstrated that there was a need for training in this sphere. A tank platoon was made available to run the problem with each infantry company, so that coordination could be emphasized.

Emphasis was placed on troop leading steps because the battalion had, as is usually the case during every tour in reserve, acquired a large number of new platoon and squad leaders. In addition, it was often evident that small unit operations forward of the main line of resistance would have run smoother had the leader followed normal troop leading steps.

Assault of a fortified position was stressed in every possible problem in Korea. That is because the Marine Corps technique of assaulting a fortified position requires great coordination that comes only with intensive and continuous training. The technique is used often in small operations in Korea and will, of course, be used in any land attack or amphibious operation undertaken by Marines. The use of flame, demolitions, and rockets does more to liven a company problem than anything else, excepting the use of tanks.

Problems of the type outlined here require a tremendous amount of effort when approached with the thoroughness common in Korea. In this case, considerable thought went into deciding what to stress and whether the training had progressed to the point that it was safe and logical to attempt these things. After these decisions were made, the problem had to be laid out and written. Certain members of the battalion staff walked

over the area four times before writing it, and they flew over the area twice in a helicopter.

On paper, the problem followed prescribed forms for field exercises, and it was complete with safety precautions, though these were kept to a minimum in the interests of realism.

The list of details covered instructions for range guards, ammunition allowances, instructions for the demolitions team that placed the charges simulating incoming artillery, umpire details and instructions, instructions for target detail, safety officers' details and instructions, a scenario that set up situations and requirements necessary to steer the problem in the right direction, a complete battalion operation order, and a critique format.

The problem strove for realism in such things as casualty evacuation. A regular forward aid station was established and casualties designated by umpires were treated and tagged by corpsmen, evacuated by Korean Service Corps stretcher bearers, and an S-1 representative made casualty reports just as if it were the real thing. Arranging for the bearers, corpsmen, and ambulances added to the details connected with the problem.

Unit-scheduled training in Korea



covers such a multitude of "sins" that it could never be completely documented in an article such as this. No attempt has been made to enumerate the almost endless list of subjects covered in training carried out in Korea. However, perhaps the foregoing will serve to point up the fact that the training given our Marines there is exceptional, to say the least.

A number of schools are currently being operated by the 1st Marine Division and others are contemplated. They were created to fill a definite need for trained men in various fields where there were shortages, and where the time element precluded the possibility of waiting for qualified replacements.

The 1st Marine Division's school for non-commissioned officers is probably the one most valuable training asset in Korea, and, incidentally, it answers to a certain extent the question posed by MSgt Charles V. Crumb's article (*A Staff NCO School?*) in the August 1952 *Gazette*.

The mission of the school is to qualify sergeants for promotion to staff non-commissioned rank. For a long time all students were sergeants. Since a new class of eighty-four students started every week, it became increasingly difficult to find that many sergeants who hadn't been through the school. The result was a compromise. Now a few corporals and staff sergeants are admitted when there are insufficient sergeants available for assignment to the school.

Students receive four weeks' instruction at the NCO school. They attend classes seven hours a day, six days a week.

Both the students and the commanders who are lucky enough to get graduates of the school in their ranks agree that the school is a good one. There is much moaning and groaning, of course, when a good squad leader has to leave his company for four weeks of school. In most cases, though, he makes up for the absence when he returns to his company with the knowledge he gains at the school.

The mission of the division legal school is to qualify certain battalion officers as trial counsel for special courts-martial. It is a two-week course and averages approximately thirty student officers per class. The divi-



sion legal section provides instructors for teaching the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The school does not remain in operation continuously but is activated as the need arises for officers with such training.

Troop Training Unit, Pacific, supplies the instructor team required to conduct periodic embarkation schools within the division. The course is normally of two weeks' duration and about thirty officers are graduated from each session of the school. The officers are qualified to conduct embarkation school for designated personnel from companies of their battalions.

At this writing, plans are afoot to add an amphibious sand table demonstration and an instructors' orientation course to training facilities of the 1st Marine Division. These two schools, like the embarkation school, will be operated by personnel from Troop Training Unit, Pacific, when and if current plans materialize.

Approximately once a month, depending on the influx of trained artillery forward observers, the 11th Marines activates the forward observer school. The school takes from occupational fields *other* than 08, the students necessary to provide the required number of qualified artillery observers. Usually this is from eight to twelve per class. Instructors for this school are provided by the 11th Marines, and the general support battalion normally furnishes a battery to fire missions necessary for instruction purposes.

MARLEX (Marine landing exercise) represents the 1st Marine Division's most grandiose training endeavor. An ideal exercise for keeping the division on its amphibious toes, it is a four-day operation involving two landings of one infantry battalion.

The exercise provides invaluable amphibious training to each infantry battalion that participates in it. Shore Party Battalion and HMR-161 take part in MARLEX each time it is run. Normally the exercise consists of landing two companies by conventional means and one company by helicopter.

The operation takes place off the

west coast of Korea. Normal shipping and small craft are made available, and a carrier participates to make the helicopter phase of each landing possible. In a sense, the embarkation school curriculum is integrated with MARLEX. Much of the value of MARLEX results from embarkation of supplies and equipment that takes place during each exercise, and the embarkation school teaches subjects required for proper execution of this phase of amphibious operations.

The landing exercise, the unit-scheduled amphibious training that prepares the battalion for the exercise, and the schools conducted by Troop Training Unit, Pacific, constitute the only amphibious training now being given Marines in Korea. This is more than adequate. However, prior to the advent of MARLEX, each regiment normally executed one complete amphibious staff problem during each tour in division reserve.

¶ IN ADDITION to the regimental amphibious staff problem, 2/7 once managed to stage a private amphibious problem. In preparation for the problem, Aggressors armed with blanks, demolitions, and 60mm illumination were "set up" in the objective area a week before D-day. Then amphibious reconnaissance patrols from battalion went ashore each night seeking information on enemy dispositions, beach conditions, etc. From information secured by these patrols the plan was developed. The battalion staff did all the staff work for an amphibious operation except the embarkation phase, and a complete operation plan was issued. Since there was no shipping available, a shore-to-shore movement had to simulate the ship-to-shore phase.

A cooperative LVT company provided the landing craft. Battalion motor transport was put in an assembly area off the beach prior to H-hour and fed into the problem at the time it would normally have come ashore. This problem had high training value, but the use of MARLEX as a training medium for all battalions is a much more efficient training method.

Under the old saying "Experience is the best teacher," on-the-job training would be of more value to the

Marine Corps than any other in Korea. However, in view of the unique characteristics of the Korean war, as it is fought during long static periods, this philosophy must be qualified.

Unfortunately, a Marine's experience in the Korean war teaches him a few things that we wouldn't normally want him to learn. It gets him to thinking war is fairly comfortable. He begins to expect his coke, candy ration, and ice cream every three days. His experience teaches him a great deal he should know about fighting in a static defense—little else. On-the-job training in Korea does not teach a Marine the basic ingredient of our amphibious assault (and of most other Marine Corps operations as well)—aggressiveness.

On the other hand, in such technical fields as communications, motor transport, tank repair, and administration, on-the-job training in the 1st Marine Division is invaluable to the Corps. On-the-job training in staff functioning, command, supporting arms coordination, terrain appreciation, and field fortifications provide people in those fields with a reservoir of valuable experience that will later serve the Marine Corps well, regardless of the type operation we may find ourselves fighting.

¶ WHEN IT COMES to attaining the second training objective listed at the beginning of this article, i.e. to maintain proficiency in defensive and offensive phases of the present land conflict, on-the-job training is unsurpassed as the most valuable training means, although it must be strongly supplemented by appropriate unit-scheduled training.

In the simile which commenced this article, training was likened to medication. In summary, training is the only antidote for the poisons of static-defensism. Bitter pills of defensive combat experience will not alone keep the Marine Corps well trained for its primary role in national defense. The First Marine Division has recognized this fact and has built a program that, augmented by combat experience, will keep this great segment of the Corps trained in every sense of the word.

USMC



Schilt



Fleming



Talbot



Bauer



Swell



Hanson



Foss



Walsh




Galer




Boyington

BEYOND

Duty's Call




From the "Flying Coffin" to the "U-Bird" . . .



**Fourteen Leathernecks with wings—
Responding to crisis as they conquered the skies**

By Sgt Cliff Spieler

Robinson



Smith

Elrod



DeBlanc



HEROISM IS SPONTANEOUS. IT IS born of a situation and flesh and blood. It can be prolonged in time, recorded in word, but never emulated. For heroism is individual: a single person rising to that situation. Times of crisis breed heroic men, and society attempts to repay them in some small way. Admiration and respect, to be sure. Perhaps a decoration.

The highest honor which can be paid to the heroes of the United States is the Congressional Medal of Honor. For "extraordinary heroism" or "conspicuous gallantry," and always "above and beyond the call of duty."

Nine Marine aviators have been so decorated. Five more did not live to receive their honor. Fourteen men, each one individually heroic, each one risking life beyond the call of duty.

Nineteen-twenty-eight was a time of crisis in Nicaragua, and nine men's lives hung in the balance. At Guadalcanal in 1942, the situation likewise was critical. But men of decision had been bred for these times of crisis, just as they had been for World War I.

Military aviation was still a new thing in 1917, and when United States forces went to Europe, the still-infant Marine air arm tagged along. In those days, Leatherneck flyers were going up in the British-designed

American-manufactured DeHavilland, whose early models had been labeled the "Flying Coffin." The plane was a two-seater, and when, on October 14, 1918, 2d Lt Ralph Talbot took off with his squadron for a raid on Thielt, Belgium, his observer was Cpl Robert G. Robinson. Six days earlier, Lt Talbot had shot down a German plane, but this was to be his day of glory.

Twelve German scouting planes jumped the Talbot-Robinson DH after it had been separated from its squadron, and one of them was shot down. But Robinson was shot in the elbow, stomach, and hip and completely disabled. Talbot sent another German plane down in flames, then took off for home. The Leatherneck plane crossed German lines at an altitude of fifty feet through intense enemy air and ground fire and returned to its home field. Both Lt Talbot and Cpl Robinson were awarded the Medal of Honor. Robinson survived his wounds and earned the distinction of becoming the first and only enlisted Marine aviator to win the nation's highest award, but Talbot was killed less than two weeks later in a crash. In 1937, the Navy named a destroyer after him.

The First Marine Aviation Force came home from Europe when the war ended and got down to the business of developing its techniques. Ten years later, a young lieutenant astounded the nation with another Marine "first" and proved beyond a doubt that the Corps was indeed fighting in the air, as well as on land and sea.

Nicaragua was aflame, and a brigade of U. S. Marines had been assigned the task of occupying the country to guarantee a peaceful election under terms of the Stimson Agreement. But a bandit named Sandino would have no peaceful election and began a campaign of organized banditry in the mountainous country. The Marines became involved in bitter fighting to preserve order.

On January 5, 1928, a Marine observation plane picked up a message from the commander of a Leatherneck detachment at Quilali that his unit was surrounded and that fifteen Marines were wounded, nine of them seriously. Bandit attacks were con-

tinuing, and immediate evacuation of the seriously wounded was necessary to save their lives.

Lt C. Frank Schilt volunteered to attempt a rescue. He replaced the small wheels on his O2U Corsair two-seater observation craft with bomber wheels to prepare for the beating he knew his landing gear faced. He dismantled his machine guns, threw away his parachute, and generally eliminated all but the absolutely necessary weight. Quilali was in a hole-like valley surrounded by rugged mountains, and the only possible landing spot was a road about 300 feet long and 15 feet wide which the ambushed Marines extended to 400 by 70.

SCHILT'S FIRST attempt to put down on the rough and bumpy road failed, and the flyer decided to try to "drop" his plane in. The first drop was about ten feet. The plane rolled a short distance, bounced thirty feet, hit the ground again, bounced ten feet further, and rolled up to a deep ditch at the end of the "field"—in one piece. Getting off the ground again was the next problem. While Schilt revved-up his engine, two Marines held the wingtips. At a signal, they released their grip simultaneously, and the plane was catapulted off the field.

During the next two days, Schilt repeated his performance nine times, evacuating the wounded men and flying in a relief CO to replace the unit commander who was among the seriously wounded. Schilt came home from his exploit to an admiring public. He was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Calvin Coolidge in a White House ceremony. And, when the Nicaraguan campaign was completed, Marine aviation settled down once again to plan and to train.

In the dark days following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the American people's morale was given a much-needed shot in the arm by the Marines on Wake Island. Capt Henry T. Elrod was a pilot with VMF-211 which had flown twelve Wildcat fighters into Wake from the USS *Enterprise* on December 4. When the Japanese came, the Wake pilots rose to meet them in their F4Fs. While the Wildcats were in the air, the small is-

land detachment held off the might of the enemy task force.

On December 9th and 12th, Elrod was particularly spectacular, shooting down a brace of Japanese planes and executing bombing and strafing runs against enemy ships from extremely low altitudes. When the last Wildcat fighter had been destroyed, VMF-211 made its stand on the ground. Capt Elrod assumed command on one flank of the line set up to oppose the enemy landing and conducted a brilliant defense. A Japanese bullet found its mark shortly before the island surrendered to the overwhelming odds.

His citation for the Medal of Honor, which was awarded to him posthumously in 1946 after the complete story of the gallant Wake defense had become known, credited Elrod with "inflicting deadly damage upon a large Japanese vessel, thereby sinking the first major warship to be destroyed by small caliber bombs delivered from a fighter-type aircraft."

The United States was still on the defensive when the Japanese attacked Midway. Once again Marine aviation scored. On June 4, 1942, Capt Richard E. Fleming came back from an initial attack on an enemy aircraft carrier. His plane had been riddled by 179 hits from Japanese fighters and antiaircraft batteries, and he had suffered two wounds. But Fleming was





Henderson Field: key to Guadal's skies

in the air again that night, and, on the following day, he led the second division of his squadron in a coordinated glide bombing and dive bombing assault on an enemy ship. His SB2U Vindicator was hit on the way in, but he pressed the assault and got his bombs away.

Although initial reports did not include the fact, Fleming's flaming plane crashed into the *Mikuma*, a heavy cruiser. Japanese Adm Akira Soji regarded the Marine pilot's act as deliberate, noting in his diary, "I saw a dive bomber dive into the last turret and start fires. He was very brave." Fleming's posthumous citation spoke of his fearless determination.

Several months after the tide of Japanese conquest was turned at Midway, the Marines began the first United States offensive of the war by landing on Tulagi, Tanambogo, Gavutu, and Guadalcanal islands in the Solomons. The resultant battle for the southern Solomons was to be the turning point of the Pacific war. If the American offensive failed, the gate to Australia lay open to the Japanese. Here, from the small airstrip which would be the key to the entire struggle, Marine aviation was to find its place in the sun.

On the 2d of August 1942, VMF-223, commanded by Capt John L.

Smith, sailed on the escort carrier *Long Island* from Pearl Harbor. Smith's outfit, equipped with brand-new Wildcats, became the first fighter squadron to land on Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, on August 20th, less than two weeks after the first Marines had hit Beach Red. With the fighter squadron came the twelve Dauntless dive bombers of Maj Richard C. Mangrum's VMSB-232.

Smith's planes were in the air constantly, defending against Japanese raids on the airfield and American positions. On the 24th, twenty-seven enemy aircraft from the carrier *Ryujo* headed for Henderson Field. They never made it. VMF-223 intercepted the planes and shot down sixteen of them, exploding for all time the myth of invincibility which had surrounded the Japanese pilot and his Zero fighter since Bataan. On the 30th, the squadron knocked down fourteen enemy planes, with four of these personally credited to Smith.

That same day, reinforcements flew in to Henderson Field commanded by Maj Robert E. Galer. For the first time, the odds were evening somewhat. After shooting down two Japanese planes on September 11, Galer was shot down himself but swam ashore. At the same time, Smith and three of his pilots were disposing of five bombers. The next day, the same

four engaged twenty-six bombers and sixteen Zeros. Six Japanese bombers and a Zeke went down without an American loss. During the period from August 21 to September 15, Smith's score was sixteen enemy planes, while Galer's tally for a twenty-nine day period was eleven.

Three days before Smith's squadron was relieved on October 12, VMF-121, with Capt Joseph J. Foss as executive officer, flew in to Henderson Field. And on the 16th, LtCol Harold W. Bauer's VMF-212 at Efate answered a hurry-call for reinforcements.

These were the critical days when the fate of Guadalcanal hung in the balance. Japanese planes attempted to soften up American positions for the drive planned by LtGen Harukichi Hyakutake. But they had to reckon with the Marine Wildcats. As Bauer's squadron began landing at Henderson Field on the 16th, nine enemy Vals headed in for a raid. Although his fuel tanks were nearly empty, Bauer took out after the dive bombers and shot down four. A week later, Foss knocked down four Zeros, and turned the trick again on the 25th. He got three more on November 7, was shot down himself, but made it back to his base.

THE GUADALCANAL campaign reached its turning point on November 14th, one of Marine Aviation's greatest days. The flyers from Henderson Field wrecked a Japanese convoy bringing reinforcements to the island that day. But they also lost Bauer.

As he and Foss swooped low to strafe Japanese transports, Zeros attacked them. Foss disposed of one, then turned to find out what had happened to his running mate. He saw an oil slick below with Bauer in the middle and, diving low, saw Bauer swimming. He tried to drop his rubber raft, but the release wouldn't work. A faulty radio prevented him from notifying Henderson Field. As a result, by the time Foss could get back to Henderson and a Grumman amphibian J2F Duck could be dispatched to the Russell Islands area where Bauer had last been seen, it was dark. A four-day search was unsuccessful.

By November 19, Foss had personally shot down twenty-three planes

and had damaged a number of others so severely that their destruction was probable. When, on January 15, after a brief rest period, he knocked down three more, he broke Capt Eddie Rickenbacker's World War I mark of twenty-five. His new standard was also destined to be smashed. One Marine airman, one Navy flyer, and five Army Air Force pilots in Europe later exceeded Foss' record.

With the Guadalcanal campaign all but over, Marine flyers looked to the North. Bauer was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously; Galer, Smith, and Foss received theirs in person. Many of the veterans went home for a stateside tour to train the new pilots, a silent "well done" from every infantryman on the 'Canal going with them. Most of the old hands wanted more combat, but their cases were similar to Capt Smith's. When he applied for another South Pacific tour, he was told, "Not until you've trained 150 John Smiths." He didn't get overseas again for nearly two years.

won the Medal of Honor on January 31, 1943. His flight of fighters was escorting SBD Dauntlesses and TBF Avengers on a bombing raid on enemy shipping in Vella Gulf. Japanese fighters rose to meet them. DeBlanc's unit sailed into the superior enemy force enabling the dive bombers and torpedo planes to complete their runs. Despite the fact that his fuel was running low, DeBlanc kept up the fight, shooting down five planes before being forced to ditch his own damaged craft over Jap-held Kolombangara. He was rescued, protected by a coast-watcher, and finally returned to his home base thirteen days later.

New targets and new missions were constantly coming within range of the Marine flyers, and, on April 7, 1943, 1st Lt James E. Swett performed probably the outstanding single aerial combat feat of World War II. The twenty-two-year-old pilot was leading a division of four Marine Wildcats. Their mission: to help intercept a wave of 150 Japanese planes headed

abled, his windshield shattered, and his face slashed by the flying glass, Swett made a water landing off Tulagi. The entire seven-plane killing lasted only fifteen minutes, and Swett was awarded the Medal of Honor.

It was at this time that a new and deadly fighter plane was first making itself felt in the air over the Solomons. The F4U Corsair, whose name would become synonymous with Marine aviation and close air support, came to the South Pacific with VMF-124. Among the men piloting the new gull-winged "U-bird" was Lt Kenneth A. Walsh.

The Japanese were seeking revenge for the loss of Guadalcanal and Adm Yamamoto himself went to Rabaul to supervise the wrecking of American air power in the Solomons. On April 1st, fifty-eight Zeros swept in to try to knock out the U. S. fighters on Banika and Guadalcanal. They shot down six defenders, but lost eighteen Zekes, three of them to Walsh. The Japanese sent fifty-eight fighters and forty-nine Betty bombers from Truk to reinforce Rabaul on May 10. Three days later, Marine and Army fighters ran into twenty-five Zeros escorting a reconnaissance plane. Walsh shot down three, other Leatherneck flyers twelve more, and the P-38s still another in the sixteen plane killing.

U. S. ground forces skipped over Kolombangara and landed on Vella Lavella on August 15. An elaborate fighter screen over ships and the beachhead, together with raids on Japanese fields at Kahili, Ballale, and Buin, had been worked out, and not one hit was made on a ship during daylight. Walsh, recently returned from a recreation tour in Sydney, knocked down three planes while protecting the ships, bringing his score to thirteen. He had shot the first down after a chase, then had turned into a flight of nine Vals and gotten two more. Finally sandwiched alone between Vals below and Zeros above, he suffered two 20mm holes in his right wing, a cut hydraulic line, a punctured horizontal stabilizer, and a popped right tire. Nevertheless, Walsh




So Guadalcanal became a page in the history books and an everlasting tribute to Marine aviation. That memory became a vivid one again last August when, nearly ten years later, the newspapers reported that Col Robert Galer, the commanding officer of Marine Air Group Twelve, had been shot down over Korea and had been rescued by helicopter from behind enemy lines.

As the Solomon Islands land fighting shifted northward, so did the air battles. 1st Lt Jefferson J. DeBlanc

for American shipping in Tulagi Harbor. The four Leatherneck fighters hit a formation of fifteen Vals, and Swett exploded three of the Aichi bombers in their dive.

Separated from the other planes of his division while clearing the concentrated antiaircraft fire sent up from our own ships below, Swett continued his assault. He tore into another group of six enemy bombers, chased them across Florida Island, and shot down four of them. His cooling system destroyed, his engine partially dis-





While the Wildcats were aloft, Wake stopped the enemy

made a perfect landing at Munda, but his plane was so badly shot up it was junked.

Fifteen days later, engine trouble brought Walsh to Munda Airfield again. He changed planes and rejoined his group over Kahili airfield on Bougainville. In a battle with fifty enemy fighters, his plane was shot up again, but he still shot down four Japanese planes. Unable to get back to land, Walsh made a dead-stick landing off Vella Lavella, was rescued, and received the Medal of Honor for his latest exploits.

On September 16th, the Black Sheep squadron, VMF-214, made its first strike against Kahili Airfield. Maj Gregory Boyington, an ex-Flying Tiger with six Japanese planes to his credit before America went to war, was the commanding officer. On that first flight, Boyington shot down five Japanese planes, and in the ensuing weeks, the Black Sheep roamed the skies challenging the enemy to come up and fight. Sometimes they did, and Boyington's personal total reached twenty-five by December 23d.

Enroute to Rabaul on January 2, 1944, Boyington developed an oil leak, but he shot down one plane to tie Joe Foss' record. Then his mates saw him diving out of the sun on five Zeros, but lost track of him. Boyington didn't come back from the mission, was listed as missing in action, and

was awarded the Medal of Honor.

When he was released from a prison camp near Yokohama at the end of the war, Boyington filled in the missing details. On his last mission, he had shot down two additional planes, bringing his total to twenty-eight, including the six over China. He had been knocked down and had parachuted into St. George's Channel near New Britain. Four Zeros had strafed him for fifteen minutes, but they didn't hit him, and he was taken prisoner by a Japanese submarine just before dark.

AMERICAN FORCES were on Bougainville by now. The landings at Cape Torokina had begun on November 1st, and 1st Lt Robert M. Hanson was one of the Marine flyers covering the assault. On D-Day, Hanson attacked six torpedo bombers, forcing them to jettison their bombs before his plane was hit by the rear gunner of a Kate attack plane. He was picked up by the USS *Sigourney*, a destroyer. Although he was given credit for only one plane that day, most sources indicate Hanson probably shot down three.

While fighting a lone battle against enemy interceptors trying to attack our bombers in a raid on Simpson Harbor January 24th, Hanson shot down four Zeros and probably a fifth. He was cited for the Medal of Honor,

but did not live to receive it. After bringing his official score to twenty-five, he was killed on February 2d when his Corsair failed to pull out of a strafing run on Cape St. George.

As Japanese air resistance waned, Marine aviation devoted itself more to the equally-vital role of close support for the Leatherneck infantryman. From land and sea bases, they ranged up and down the island chains where the gravel-crunchers were chewing their way along the road to Tokyo.

Today, the Wildcats are gone and the Corsairs are no longer in production. But in the skies over Korea, the Banshees, the Panthers, and the Skyknights drone their way into combat missions against a new enemy, and the last of the F4Us rain their "whistling death" on Red troops below.

The tradition exemplified by Lt Schilt in the mountains of Nicaragua twenty-five years ago still lives. Each time a jet takes off from a forward air base or a Corsair leaves a carrier, a new page is turned in the story of Marine aviation, built by the thousands of men who have flown and serviced the planes for forty-one years and the fourteen who have won their nation's highest honor.

USMC





By Capt J. M. Ellicott, USN (Ret.)

WHEN THE USS BALTIMORE WAS ordered to join Commodore Dewey on the Asiatic Station shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War she was given a flagship complement of Marines under Capt O. C. Berryman and 1st Lt Dion Williams, as it was intended that she should relieve the *Olympia*.

On their way out to the Asiatic the Marines were, in addition to their regular allocations, organized and drilled as gun crews for the eight-inch guns on the *Baltimore*'s forecastle and poop. Thus it was that as we approached Manila Bay on the night of 30 April 1898, they found themselves manning the port gun of my forecastle division in anticipation of the possibility of our being engaged by the Spaniards, while my own gun crew manned the starboard gun.

We approached the Boca Grande entrance to the bay in column, *Olympia* leading, *Baltimore* second, and the revenue cutter *McCulloch* next, with the collier *Nanshan* and dispatch vessel *Zafiro* bringing up the rear. No lights were displayed except a boxed guide lamp at the stern of each vessel. The night was dark, a waning quarter moon being concealed behind heavy clouds.

We were all very tense, fully ex-

pecting to hear the *Olympia* blown up by a mine. There were mines, but we brushed so close to El Fraile Rock that we actually passed around them.

Lt Williams and I were standing close together, almost under the bridge where we could hear even a whisper above us. By now almost the entire column had passed into the bay—apparently undetected—and we were just beginning to relax when a column of flame shot up from the *McCulloch*'s smokestack.

"The cat's out of the bag!" someone muttered on the bridge. (We learned next day that the *McCulloch*'s chief engineer became so mortified that he had a heart attack and died that night.)

GUNS BEGAN TO FIRE FROM THE Spanish shore batteries and a few shells splashed around us. But the firing was brief, indicating the enemy must have realized that we had slipped by. Then we saw a display of Ardois signal lights on the flagship and heard the signal officer on our bridge say, "Flagship signals speed four knots."

"That means we are to reach Manila after daylight," our skipper said. "Pass the word that the crews may sleep at their guns."

Gradually our forecastle gun crews

stretched out on the deck while Dion Williams and I sat for a while on a boatswain's chest, listening to the Marines and sailors exchange good-humored badinage in low tones until they dropped off to sleep.


Bye and bye I, too, grew sleepy and stretched out between the gun crews next to the Marine sergeant gun pointer. Before morning it grew chilly, and as I was wearing a white uniform and thin, scanty underwear I began to shiver noticeably. Whereupon the sergeant went below, brought up his overcoat, covered me with it, and tucked me in as though I were a child.

It seemed but moments later that we were aroused by a cry from the bridge:

"There they are!"

It was daylight. Ahead of us in the distance toward Manila loomed a for-

Right: USS Baltimore—starboard rudder gave Marines first shot



Marines were the first to fire at the Battle of Manila Bay.

They were also first to fly the U. S. flag on Spanish soil

est of masted vessels. But it was soon seen that they were merchantmen. Then, off to our right, we saw the Spanish fleet in front of Cavite Arsenal.

Our flagship signaled, "Prepare for general action," and changed course to starboard as flags were loosed from stops and flown from every masthead.

Our captain called down to us: "Well, men, we must fight on empty stomachs, but we have full hearts. Let us see what we can do under the old flag once more."

Whereupon a Marine ducked below and brought up an opened tin of hardtack and placed it beside a scuttlebutt of fresh water.

THE TEN-INCH shore guns in front of Manila opened fire on us but, following the example of our flagship, all of our ships but one ignored them. She fired one shot which, we learned afterward, ripped a long way through the city and discouraged further firing from that direction.

When we got within range of the Spanish fleet, our lead ship turned to starboard, thereby presenting her port batteries. Thus it happened, as the *Baltimore* turned to starboard in column, our Marine gun crew got in the first shot, almost simultaneously with the first from the *Olympia*. Unhappily ours fell short but not through any fault of the gun pointer. The range had been taken from a newly-invented range finder, on trial on the *Baltimore* only, that consisted of a telescope on a tripod at each end of the

ship. Simultaneous bearings on the target were transmitted to a plotting room where their intersection and the base between the telescope gave a plotted range. The first range, however, had been before the ship was running at right angles to the direction of the target and was considerably in error. Fortunately, perhaps, the telescope tripods were almost immediately wrecked by the concussion of our own gunfire, and the ranges were thereafter given by chart plottings on the bridge.


It was soon evident that we were never to be engaged on both sides at the same time so the Marines were distributed to other battle stations. One group performed some alert damage control work by extinguishing a fire below decks caused by a bursting shell.

But the *Baltimore*'s Marines were yet to function in a historical way.

On 2 May, Commodore Dewey transported by water all Spanish families and other noncombatants remaining in Cavite to Manila, and almost immediately looting began in the vacated area. Arsenal material, as well as household furniture, went streaming across the causeway in vehicles and by piggy-back. Commodore Dewey thereupon ordered the Marine detachment from the *Baltimore*, under Lt Williams, to occupy the arsenal and protect property. The detachment was quartered in the old Spanish barracks near Fort San Felipe and on 3 May, Lt Williams and his detachment with due ceremony hoisted on the flagstaff in front of the fort the first United States flag flown over Spanish soil in the Spanish-American War. That flag is now preserved in Mahan Hall, U. S. Naval Academy, along with the Union Jack of the sunken battleship *Maine*. USMC



Brigadier General Dion Williams—as a lieutenant he raised the flag at Cavite



in brief

Consolidation of Marine Corps recruiting, reserve, and officer procurement offices throughout the nation was accomplished last month. Seven districts replace the ten reserve and six recruiting area headquarters. Savings in both money and manpower are expected as a result of the move.

Purple heart veterans of the campaigns on New Britain and in the Central Solomons may obtain free copies of the latest Marine Corps Historical Branch monographs on those actions by writing Code AO3D at Headquarters Marine Corps.




United Press


Chinese Nationalist Marines (above) simulate a landing attack on a shoreline cliff during recently held Formosan maneuvers.

The Sea Dart (right), the Navy's experimental jet seaplane equipped with hydro-skis, is shown resting on the ground during pre-flight trials in San Diego Bay, California.

Regulations governing the payment of uniform allowances to reserve officers have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The rules cover initial, maintenance, and active duty allowances. They were approved under provisions of the Reserve Act of 1952 and are intended to equalize as nearly as possible the payments to officers of all reserve components.

The Rolligon (below), shown travelling upgrade in deep sand, was designed for the Navy at its Civil Engineering Research and Evaluation Laboratory in California. Built around a conventional jeep, the new vehicle uses pneumatic tires four feet wide and two feet high. It was designed to traverse all types of terrain while transporting cargo or personnel.





Participants (above) in the Navy experiment in which twenty-three officers and enlisted men remained in a submerged submarine for sixty days, are given an audio test. The experiment in the USS *Haddock* was designed to test the feasibility of long-range cruising in atomic submarines.

The Navy's new Bell XHSL-1 helicopter, the first designed for anti-submarine warfare, is being tested at Fort Worth, Texas. The craft is twice as heavy as helicopters now used by the Navy. Its blades, however, can be folded to facilitate storage.

Three Marine Corps boards recently nominated 3,056 lieutenants and captains for promotion to the next higher grade.

Summer training for reserve Marines began last month. By the end of the training periods in September, more than 15,400 officer and enlisted reserves will have received two weeks of intensive field work and specialized training. The first group of men reporting consisted of volunteer reserves not members of organized units. Training of the organized reserve outfits, both aviation and ground, will begin early in June. All aviation and ninety percent of the ground units will attend the summer training.


The British Admiralty announced that Russia now has 350 fully-manned submarines in commission.

First jet night kill in aviation history was credited to Marine pilot Maj William T. Stratton, Jr. (left) and MSgt Hans C. Hoglind, his airborne intercept operator. Flying an F3D Skynight, the two Leatherneck flyers tracked the enemy YAK-15 on the radar system and followed it deep into Red territory. The Skynight's gunsight took over from there.



The Mighty-Mite (below), new Marine Corps jeep designed to be carried into combat by helicopters, was tested recently at Quantico. The 1500-pound, all-wheel-drive vehicle has engineering features which allow it to hit a six-inch high obstruction at fifty miles per hour without faltering. It is capable of deep water fording, will slide off a hillside before rolling over, and can push larger vehicles when they bog down. It can also keep going even if it loses a wheel.





**THERE'S
SENSE
IN
THOSE
billions**

***It costs a lot to run the Armed Forces, but it's
a cheap price to pay for the life of our nation***

THE BUDGET WHICH CONGRESS APPROVED FOR THE 1953 FISCAL year provided for \$50,072,442,000* for the Armed Forces. To the average citizen, these are only figures. Yet, the method used to arrive at them should be of interest to everyone in the military service, since such topics as national defense, NATO, and the size of the four services are involved. Then, too, the national budget also has a tremendous personal effect, because the cost of living and the size of taxes are dependent upon it.

The course of our country is not a patch-work of sudden ideas and continually changing hunches, but rather is shaped by political, economic, psychological, and military realities. U. S. political philosophy, our political system, and our foreign and domestic aims can be expressed as national objectives; these are translatable into national policy from which military policy is developed. The latter is the basis from which military plans and programs stem. Military affairs cannot be divorced from statecraft and the total national activity. National policy is directly affected by military considerations and vice-versa. Therefore, just as the U. S. national objectives are the guide for the conduct of our government, so are they the basis for a sound military policy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose lot it is to implement the military portion of our national policy, first consider the overall tasks involved and, from them, calculate the forces to do the job. This brings up the second point involved in arriving at the budget figures—the force levels of the various services.

From the national standpoint, a force level means that proportion of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force which the nation must produce and maintain to fulfill its own policy. From the military standpoint it is that proportion required to accomplish the mission of the military.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the fact that all are full-share members of a fighting team, that all are interlocking and interdependent, and that none will succeed alone.

Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and Congress approved for fiscal year 1954, an Army of twenty-one divisions and eighteen separate regiments, a Navy of over 600 fighting ships, an Air Force of 143 wings, and a Marine Corps of three divisions and three air wings, all with appropriate supporting forces.

In short review, national policy is translated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff into tasks required to support that policy. Tasks are then further broken down into forces needed. Finally, these force figures are given to the services, along with plans for their expected use. These are continuous things—projected far into

*This figure is from the 1953 fiscal year budget, since, at press time, Congress had not completed work on the 1954 budget.

By **LtCol H. B. Benge, USMC**
and
LtCol R. C. Williams, Jr. USA



the future. The cost of forces, however, must be computed annually, and yet it must tie into the overall, ultimate state of readiness.

The present period is one of expansion, one of timely preparation. It is costly. Equipment that in normal peacetime we could expect to receive in quantity over several years must be delivered in months. Reserves of fighting equipment for wartime-size military forces must be stockpiled. First-class equipment must be placed in the hands of our allies. The forces in Korea must be maintained in combat. But, because these are peacetime days, the civilian economy must not be thrown out of balance.

All of these considerations, and many more, go into putting a price on forces. The individual services are guided in their budget preparations by instructions from the Department of Defense which sets the number of months' stockpile that may be ordered, determines those items for which no stockpile is necessary, and establishes the amounts of "long re-order lead time" items for which contracts may be let. These last rules were expressed by General Marshall as "a substitution of production capacity for stockpile" in which, for example, a factory is constructed for the manufacture of a weapon. By putting the factory on a five-day single shift, a number of these weapons is produced; though not enough to meet our total requirements. In the event of mobilization, the factory can go on a seven-day week of three shifts and meet our total requirements by "X days" after mobilization day.

This is a calculated risk that provides several things: a flow of weapons now, a facility constructed and in operation, a potential of weapons because the factory is only on one shift, more jobs for civilian workers, and elimination of a manpower peak by spreading the jobs to mobilization day.

Having received these rules and their attendant voluminous and intricate explanations, each of the services computed its respective cost of operations for the fiscal year.

The process in arriving at computations for personnel costs was fairly simple. Congress has enacted laws prescribing the pay and allowances of military personnel and has set the pay

scale for civil employees of the U. S. Government. Knowing the total forces allowed, it is a comparatively simple task to figure the cost.

Understand that this is no "one man—one day" affair! It involves a tremendous amount of detailed computation and application of pay scales, grade structures, promotions, gains and losses, and other factors. It is a terribly complicated exercise in fiscal gymnastics.

The remaining, and larger, portion of the budget is even more complicated. Generally, however, it includes maintenance and operations, procurement, civilian components, public works, and other items.

THE HEADING "maintenance and operations" covers the normal day-to-day conduct of feeding, housing, training, and maneuvering the approved forces, plus utilities and repairs and alterations to grounds, structures, and equipment. The number of reports, accounts, formulas, ledgers, guesses, and forecasts needed to produce this estimate is staggering. The cost of replacing propellers on ships, of fuel that planes are going to burn, of food that individuals will eat, together with the probable location and time of consumption of these items, are samples of some of the mass of data that must be collected. Cost accounting systems and past experiences, together with estimates by experienced budgeteers, must be pulled together in proper proportion.

Procurement, carrying within its framework the estimates for stockpiles of war items, is closely related to approved forces. To these are applied the tables of organization, and then tables of allowances and equipment. Replenish factors, based on using experience, are applied to allowances and added to equipment required for new units and that to be used for stockpiling. The cost per item of the grand total is established by contract with the manufacturer, or with the procuring service in the case of single service procurement. To properly compute requirements, it becomes necessary to go to operations plans, determine what the normal use rate will be, and also fix the delivery dates to fit the contemplated force commitment schedules. In reality there is much more to estimating procurement

than merely finding out the cost of the items.

The next major title is "civilian components." Here is found our reserve pool of trained manpower which, in the event of mobilization, can be called upon to augment the regular forces as completely trained units or as highly skilled individuals. The size of the reserve force is, of necessity, dependent upon the size of the regular establishment. Today, the requirements of all services are such that an allocation of the available manpower has to be made by Department of Defense. Reserve programs must be computed by using the numbers and ranks of personnel scheduled for the various numbers of drills, the length of active duty tours for units, numbers attending schools, the facilities to be used, amounts and types of equipment to be furnished, and the time when all these things will take place. All this involves pay scales, procurement costs, travel rates, rents, utilities, and many other minor, but necessary, costs. These, totaled in the required format, represent the Reserve portion of a service's budget.

The "public works" part of a budget is handled a bit differently. Here each service compiles a list of buildings, structures, grounds, major improvements, and construction that is needed to take care of the authorized forces. This is presented to Congress separately from the regular budget. However, the steps involved in preparing these estimates and the channels through which they are presented are the same as those of the regular budgets.

The above mentioned activities represent the bulk of the budget estimates. The remaining funds are requested for such items as departmental administration, contingencies, industrial mobilization, and across-the-board activities. True, some of these are fairly large at times. Over a period of years, though, they are the minor areas.

Here, then, we see each service gathering, over a year's time, a tremendous amount of information that must be sifted, analyzed, and applied to rates and requirements in order to arrive at an estimate of the cost for the coming year. All this budget preparation creates a major accounting problem. Money that Congress

appropriates for the various titles is good for three years—that is, during the year for which it is appropriated the money can be "obligated." This, in turn, means that contracts can be entered into on the strength of the money being available. During the same year money can be "expended"—that is, actually spent with a bill presented and a check delivered to the producer. The remaining "obligated" funds are kept for two additional years. The producer must present his bill prior to the end of the third year after the money is appropriated. But, after the first year is over, no further "obligations" can be made. Any money left over reverts to the Treasury. Thus, each service, though getting money on an annual basis, must account for expenditures and obligations during the first year and account for the first year's obligations during the next two years. This has a great impact on the budget because, when presenting the budget to the review agencies within the service, the Department of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress (separately and in that order), figures for the past two years must be available for comparison with the estimate for the coming year.

Some idea of the reasons for the huge cost of operating the military services can be obtained from bits of information published from time to time in various newspapers. For example:

a. In recent years, the cost of a certain tank has increased over \$55,000 *per tank*.

b. A plane that cost \$28,000 in World War II now costs over \$200,000 to replace. (True, the replacement is a different and better plane.)

c. A private who received \$50.00 per month in 1945 now receives \$78.00 per month for the first four months and after that his pay increases to \$83.20 per month.

d. A pair of shoes that cost about \$3.75 in World War II is now being replaced, gradually, by boots costing almost \$10.00 per pair.

From the few examples above it readily can be seen that today's budget must reflect the considerable increases in prices over the past several years. Viewed in the light of purchasing power, its staggering sums begin to



The Armed Forces Policy Council in session

come into focus. Of course, the budget cannot be justified completely by the cost of materials and equipment. A too-rapid demobilization of our Armed Services after World War II, the result of the inevitable optimistic outlook which follows a "war to end wars," unquestionably has contributed to the size of our present budget. In retrospect, it is easy to analyze the effects of that demobilization. Men were released so fast that bases had to be closed completely, in some cases, and the equipment therein demilitarized or abandoned. In other instances equipment was given to foreign nations. Under the surplus disposal program, equipment was sold to individuals, companies, and foreign nations, because the Armed Forces had insufficient personnel and funds to care for it. From the vantage point of today these mistakes stand out clearly. But remember, at the time this demobilization seemed the only solution for peace-loving Americans too long at war.

The United States is now paying (literally) for that view in our present attempts to replace that equipment, for labor alone has had six salary increases since World War II. On the profit side of the ledger, though, much of the material lost is being replaced by better and improved equipment. Yes, the budget

is high! But only comparatively speaking. If, as some believe, inflation would ruin our economy and an atomic war would ruin our civilization, resulting in a return to "bow-and-arrow" days, the cost of equipping our Armed Forces with those bows and arrows would hit the man in the street just as hard as it does today. The private, dressed in sheepskins might be supported by our citizens who would pay their taxes in sheep they could ill afford to give up.

• **THE COST OF** maintaining armed forces may be high, but so is any reliable insurance. Military forces provide no monetary dividend. They only provide peace in which a dividend may be obtained. The cost of building the Great Wall of China made the Chinese unhappy. The Turks under Suleiman paid terrifically high taxes each year to support an armed force to protect their peace. We, in the United States, are doing the same. The United States has accepted the fact that, as long as any strong nation is bent on changing our way of life, we must pay the taxes necessary to protect our well-earned and much-desired peace.

Since the American way of life places the value of human life far above that of material things, Americans attempt to devise machines and

equipment to protect lives and to enable their forces to wage wars with economy in the expenditure of human life.

Hence, in compiling the budget estimate, each service naturally asks for an adequate amount of the best equipment available. When these requests are pulled together within the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, the budget undergoes its first review and a balance is made between the various branches and bureaus of each service.

FOR EXAMPLE, if the personnel people budget for 10,000 fighter pilots and the procurement people plan to buy only enough equipment to operate 5,000 fighters, then the training must come down or procurement must go up. This is an obvious over-simplification of the type of review that goes on within each service. However, it is only the first step in a series of reviews conducted before final figures are reached.

The reviews within each of the services are made by the civilian secretaries, and estimates submitted by the various branches are usually pared. Any activity which believes that it "cannot live" with the funds allowed by this review can file a reclama. (Usually, this is only a re-statement of their original case in more detail.) Upon completion of this phase—normally a several-week period—the estimates are then sent to the Department of Defense for further review.

Normally, Defense reviews the service budgets (a two-foot stack of looseleaf books per service) prior to forwarding them to the Bureau of the Budget for final pre-Congress review. However, in recent years the time lost due to the war in Korea (requiring supplemental budgets and the step-up in pace of production) has thrown the normal two-year budget preparation out of phase. Accordingly, to save time, the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Defense reviewed the service budgets jointly. The proposed budget for fiscal year 1954 was reviewed in this way.

This joint review illustrates the complete civilian control of the military. Moreover, decisions reached at budget hearings actually are more im-

portant than those of the Joint Chiefs; for while the latter make plans based on military necessity, without money a plan is only a plan.

Budget reviews by the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Defense are made with different considerations in mind than in the case of internal service reviews. The services estimate their needs for their part of the assigned tasks while the Department of Defense, by its tie-in with the Munitions Board, thinks of feasibility of execution from production viewpoints. In all reviews "water" is eliminated by forcing use of substitute items, avoiding duplications, accepting reduced support efficiency, deferring maintenance, etc. The Bureau of the Budget review, and, to a lesser degree, that of the Department of Defense, is pointed at feasibility from the point of view of national income and ever-present political considerations.

At this stage of review, the services are questioned in detail as to what is provided and how the estimates were computed. This is a minute scrutiny of the budget. Once a figure has been determined and the services have had the opportunity to submit a reclama on the cuts, the books are printed and sent to Congress for the final two reviews.

The first of these takes place in the House before the Armed Forces Subcommittee on Appropriations. For the most part, these men have been reviewing budgets for more years than most of us can remember. Their knowledge of the inner workings and hidden mechanisms involved in budget preparation is nothing short of phenomenal. Their questions clearly reveal careful thinking on the part of the people of the U. S. For example, when the figure fifty billion dollars is mentioned they begin with, "Why is it so big? What is it that costs so much? What will the nation get from spending this much money? Is all of this necessary—and why? Can the nation stand this expense?"

These members of Congress are interested in the welfare of the nation, internally from a financial load standpoint, externally from a protective view.

Of course, political considerations weigh heavily, too. But then, public opinion influences the path the U. S.

will take. Thus, we find ourselves back at the beginning of the cycle with national policies being the basis for Joint Chiefs of Staff decisions.

When the House has finished its review, the books are revised and presented to the Senate, and the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee gives the estimates the same treatment as they received in the House. However, if the estimates have been reduced by the House, the Department of Defense can ask the Senate to consider the deleted portions as well as the reduced estimate. In the event the Senate and House versions of the estimates differ, the committees meet jointly to iron out the differences. Once settled and passed by both houses, the estimates are sent to the President for signature as is any other bill.

Only after Presidential signature can the services do some concrete work on the next year's budget. For example, the preparation of the 1952 estimates was delayed because of the necessity to submit several supplemental appropriation requests in 1951.

Actually, the 1952 appropriation was signed several months after 1 July 1951. Meanwhile, the services had to operate on a monthly appropriation based on the average of the last few months expenditures in 1951. That delay, in turn, caused a delay in starting work on the estimates for 1953.

The estimates, as prepared by the activities within each service, totaled many more billion than the fifty finally authorized. This does not mean that the military are poor estimators or that they wish to travel better than first class. Neither does it mean that the review agencies are blind to national necessity. It simply means that military personnel desire the best of men and materials in adequate quantities to insure as complete a defense of the U. S. as is possible, and that review agencies have to establish a balance between internal economy and external jeopardy.

But—in achieving that balance it has become necessary to permit the defense forces to spend more than fifty billion dollars of our money during fiscal 1953. With today's international insecurity, even that is a cheap price to pay for the life of our nation.

USMC

passing in review

Hare and Hounds . . .

THE WHITE RABBIT—Bruce Marshall, 262 pages, illustrated. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. \$3.50

In September 1939, Forest Frederick Edward Yeo-Thomas was surrounded by lovely mannequins dressed in the latest fashions. This was as it should be for a director in the firm of Molyneux, the well-known Parisian dressmaker. In 1946, he was once again surrounded by the mannequins of Molyneux. But in the intervening seven years Yeo-Thomas had become a wing commander in the RAF, added the George Cross, Military Cross, and Croix de Guerre to his chest, and undergone such extraordinary experiences that a master of fiction would have difficulty matching them.



The story of this British secret agent, who was so instrumental in organizing the French Resistance, is told by Bruce Marshall in his latest book, *The White Rabbit*.

After enlisting in the RAF, Yeo-Thomas had difficulty convincing his superiors of his potentialities, despite his extensive French background. But convince them he did, and in February 1943 he was dropped by parachute into France with the mission of investigating the organization of the French Resistance. Yeo-Thomas had been given the identification name of Shelley, and the code name of *le petit*

lapin blanc (the little white rabbit). The latter designation was particularly apt, for the British agent was involved in a game of hare and hounds with the Gestapo soon after he set foot in France.

In the France of early 1943, Yeo-Thomas found the Resistance consisted of uncoordinated and badly disorganized groups, rendering it virtually ineffective. He at once set about organizing it, although he ran into difficulties getting the Communists to cooperate with anyone. To mislead the Gestapo, he found he had to change his attire several times a day, put cardboard into a shoe to change his walk, and maintain a wide variety of residences, or hiding places.

During his stay in England in the summer of 1943, the Gestapo moved in and arrested many top Resistance leaders. Resistance organization deteriorated rapidly, and in September Yeo-Thomas was flown back to France to save what was left and reorganize it. His encounters with the Gestapo and his numerous narrow squeaks became even more breathtaking on this second mission, which was largely successful.

In February 1944, Yeo-Thomas once again parachuted into France, this time with the dual purpose of inspecting the Resistance and also rescuing a close friend and key Resistance leader from German captivity. But this time he was not so fortunate. The Gestapo picked up a contact Yeo-Thomas was to meet. The wretch had violated security by writing the name, Shelley, on a piece of paper, as well as the address of the meeting. The Gestapo pounced on Yeo-Thomas, screaming, "Wir haben Shelley!" He was thrust into a car, and as his captors began beating him they screamed once more, "Wir haben Shelley!"

The remainder of the book deals with Yeo-Thomas' brutal beatings and scientific torture at the hands of the sadistic Gestapo; his imprison-

ment in the infamous Fresnes prison, and at the horror camps of Compiègne, Saarbrücken, Buchenwald, Gleina, and Rehmsdorf; his attempts to escape; and his final escape shortly before V-E Day.

Mr. Marshall's writing style is sometimes moralizing, sometimes ponderous, but any shortcomings on his part are more than relieved by the almost unbelievable Yeo-Thomas.

Reviewed by LtCol John A. Crown

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Marine Corps Association



The following rules will govern this competition:

(1) Essays awarded "Prize" or "Honorable Mention" are for publication in the *Marine Corps Gazette*. Essays not awarded a prize or honorable mention may be published at the discretion of the Editorial Board, and the authors of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for articles not submitted in competition.

(2) Essays should not exceed 5,000 words.

(3) All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately $8\frac{1}{2} \times 11$, and must be submitted in triplicate, each copy complete in itself and firmly bound together.

(4) The name of the competitor shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading must contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last five words of the essay, in addition to the title. This phrase shall appear:

(a) On the title page of the essay.

(b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the competitor.

(c) Above the name and address of the competitor, inside the envelope containing this identification.

The envelope containing the author's identification will not be opened until winning essays have been determined. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a large sealed envelope marked "Prize Essay Contest Group I, II, III" (as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.

(5) Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, on or before 30 September 1953.

(6) Awards will be made by ballot and without knowledge of the names of the competitors.

(7) The attention of contestants is called to the fact that an essay must be original and should be analytical or interpretative.

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